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The Industrial Detachment of Workers

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[The authors of the article are co-workers at the Sociological Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Yelenga Davydovna Igikhanyan is a candidate of philosophical sciences and senior science associate; Irina Yeryevna Petrushina is a candidate of philosophical sciences and science associate; Fridrikh Rafailovich Filippov is a doctor of philosophical sciences, professor and leader of the scientific collective on Social Structure. They have appeared repeatedly in the journal with articles, reviews and informative materials]

[Text] Perestroyka which is gaining strength and has entered a new stage of profound changes in the economy and policy has raised the question of a substantial revision and clarification of the conceptual apparatus of social sciences. In sociology this concerns primarily the elaboration of a modern concept of the social structure of Soviet society and the understanding of its new elements and development trends.

In the general context of perestroyka processes put in the forefront are not only the most numerous but also the most organized social groups. One of these is the industrial detachment of workers. The article examines certain traits of its appearance as a specific social community comprising one of the internally heterogeneous elements in the social structure of Soviet society in terms of its specific corporative-sectorial "breakdown."

The validity of isolating the industrial detachment of workers as a social community of people is determined by the relative inner integrity which overlaps the social and professional polymorphism inherent to it. Precisely this integrity is characterized by the concepts introduced by K. Marx of the "aggregate worker," the "aggregate worker personnel" and which are based not only on production-technological but also on the social relations of the workers. "All these workers together, as a single production collective, represents the living machine for the production...of products..." [1]. Marx continued his idea further: "A characteristic feature of the capitalist method of production is precisely the fact that it separates the different types of labor one from another and in a way isolates also mental and physical labor—or those types of labor in which one or another aspect prevails—and distributes them between different people. This, however, does not prevent the material product from being the product of the joint labor of all the peoples..., on the other hand, this separation in no way impedes the relation of each of these people individually to capital of inevitably remaining the relation of a hired worker, the relation of a productive worker in this specific sense" [ibid.].

The social distinction between physical (predominantly physical) and mental (predominantly mental) labor should not obscure either their inner heterogeneity or the degree of the closeness of the strata comprising these large social groups nor the possibility of isolating one or another as relatively integral communities in the different elements of the social structure. From this viewpoint it is time to take a new look at the rigid opposition of the social functions of the working class and the intelligentsia and which has been proclaimed in the well-known publication "Scientific Communism and the Falsification of It by Renegades" [3] and many subsequent works.

In this context it is wise to recall that V.I. Lenin constantly drew attention to the inner heterogeneity of the working class, pointing to the particular role of the industrial workers: "...Precisely the urban and generally the factory-plant industrial workers are capable of leading the entire mass of workers...in the undertaking of creating a new, socialist, social system in the entire struggle for the complete elimination of classes" [2]. In maintaining their specific nature, the industrial workers at the same time assume ever-greater common social traits with the production-technical intelligentsia and white collar personnel employed at industrial enterprises. The restructuring of economic relations on the basis of cost accounting and the independence of the labor collectives will intensify their inner consolidation and the unity of corporative interests among the groups and strata comprising them.

In no way accidental is the fact that in the course of strikes by Soviet miners, as an extreme form of fighting for their economic and social interests (and which for the national economy as a whole has far-reaching negative consequences) as brought about by the years-long neglect of urgent needs by the workers on the part of the central departments and local authorities, a high level of organization and solidarity among the participants was demonstrated. This is directly linked to the homogeneity of conditions of labor and everyday life, the values, way of life of the entire socioprofessional community. Clearly, the strikes were preceded by a sharp rise in the degree of class and sociocorporative self-awareness of the workers.

The consolidation of class, professional, sectorial, corporative and regional interests gained its expression in the sociopolitical sphere as well: at the end of 1989, a new form of organizing the public arose, the Union of Kuzbass Workers. There is a tendency for the development of analogous associations in other regions of the nation.

The research and the social development of the industrial detachment of workers was carried out with the participation of the article's authors in 1986-1989 [4].

The object of the research was viewed as a complex sociostructural formation encompassing workers in industry, construction, transportation and communications and the community of which was brought by relations of construction-technical and social collaboration. The features characterizing the inner unity of this detachment of workers included: working as a hired worker at the enterprises (associations) and institutions comprising the state sector of the economy; professional employment in industrial and scientific-industrial types of labor [5]; the receiving of the basic portion of income in the form of wages. In addition to the socioeconomic characteristics, there are also specific sociopolitical and sociocultural characteristics of the industrial detachment of workers.

The research was conducted¹ at enterprises of the Donbass (Novokramatorsk Machine Building Plant, with the polling being directed by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V.V. Dubinin), the Ural (Nizhniy Tagil Metallurgical Combine imeni V.I. Lenin, with the polling conducted by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences B.A. Yefimov) and Voronezh (agricultural machine building plant, with Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A.A. Utukov participating in organizing the poll).

Extensive use was made of the experience of previous studies and in particular the data on the merging of the most skilled industrial workers with the engineers and technicians [6, 7], on the interstratum differences within the main groups of the industrial workers disclosed on the basis of international comparisons [8, 9] and on the social mobility of the industrial personnel [10, 11] and so forth.

Materials of state statistics were analyzed (some used in this article) making it possible to judge the social characteristics of the industrial detachment of workers and their dynamics. However, on the basis of such data, the groups of workers of interest to us can be isolated only by the sectorial feature (employment in a certain sector of the national economy), while the boundaries of the industrial detachment do not coincide with the intersectorial boundaries as certain types of industrial labor are found, for example, in agricultural production (the servicing of power units, modern means of transport and communications, the equipment fleet and so forth), in the sphere of science and scientific servicing and so forth. The "subdetachment" of the construction workers is also heterogeneous as this includes workers from enterprises of the construction industry as well as those directly employed in construction-installation work with a varying degree of the mechanization of labor and different forms of its organization. For this reason, the groupings used in current statistics need correction.

As statistics shows, in 1987, in industry, construction, and transportation and communications (for the sake of brevity in the future, we will call these the "industrial sectors") around one-half (47 percent) of the employed population of the nation was working and over the last 2 decades this indicator has remained virtually

unchanged. In the United States, the share of employees in the corresponding sectors in 1986 was 35 percent [12, p 14]. The highest percentage of persons employed in the industrial sectors was in 1987 in the RSFSR and Estonia (51 percent) with the lowest in the Central Asian Republics (34 percent in Kirghizia, 31 percent in Uzbekistan, 29 percent in Turkmenia and 38 percent in Tajikistan), in Georgia (38 percent), Moldavia (35 percent) and Azerbaijan (34 percent). In the remaining Union republics, the figure was close to the national average [12, pp 16-17].

The employment level of persons belonging to the main nationalities of the Union republics in the industrial sectors leads to definite questions (Table 1). This indicator in the Central Asian Republics, as well as in certain Baltic republics, is 1.5-2-fold below the Union average and the appropriate indicators in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Armenia. Thus, we are confronted with a definite national differentiation not only for the national economic sectors but also for the social characteristics of the population and this cannot help but leave its imprint on many aspects of interethnic relations.

Table 1: Proportional Amount of Persons of Indigenous Nationality of the Union Republic in the Total Number of Manual and White Collar Workers (Including Specialists) in the Industrial Sectors of the Economy on 1 June 1987, % [12, pp 22-23]

Republics and Nationalities	Industry	Transport and Communications	Construction
RSFSR, Russians	83	85	78
Ukraine, Ukrainians	68	71	69
Belorussia, Belorussians	77	78	76
Uzbekistan, Uzbeks	53	55	50
Kazakhstan, Kazakhs	21	28	21
Georgia, Georgians	61	68	70
Azerbaijan, Azeris	69	74	73
Lithuania, Lithuanians	71	84	81
Moldavia, Moldavians	48	54	52
Latvia, Latvians	38	38	46
Kirghizia, Kirghiz	25	35	26
Tajikistan, Tajiks	48	57	48
Armenia, Armenians	93	96	95
Turkmenistan, Turkmen	53	48	54
Estonia, Estonians	43	47	61

The industrial detachment of workers is characterized by a relatively high educational level, and by saturation with intellectual types of labor. Thus, per 1,000 employees in industry, there are over 226 specialists with

a higher and specialized secondary education, in construction the figure is 205 and in transportation and communications 179 [12, p 5].

There are almost 50 million persons in the industrial detachment with 60.8 percent of the entire average annual number of workers in the nation [12, p 45]. Over the 20 years, the skill structure of the industrial and construction workers has changed. While in 1965, some 35.7 percent of the industrial workers had categories of 4-6, in 1985, the figure was 51.2 percent and the average wage category had risen from 3.1 to 3.6; in construction the figures, respectively, were 39.2 percent and 63.5 percent, 3.2 and 4.0 [12, pp 218-220].

Thus, both in terms of the number and in terms of the role in the economic and social development of Soviet society and in terms of the educational and skill level, the industrial detachment of workers is a weighty and influential social force. Regardless of the presence of stagnation trends (low rates of reducing the number of persons employed in heavy physical labor, the preservation of routine forms of the organization of labor and unsatisfactory sanitary-hygienic conditions), the industrial detachment to an ever-greater degree is being swept up in radical socioeconomic changes. According to the data of the Credentials Commission of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies, workers from the industrial sectors made up 24.8 percent of all the deputies [13].

The level of material prosperity (in monetary terms, in terms of the amount of the average monthly wage) and the opportunities for utilizing the social development funds are higher for the industrial detachment of workers than for the other socioproduction groups of the population. Thus, the average monthly wage of the industrial-production personnel in 1987 was 9.4 percent higher than the national economic average, in transportation it was 18 percent higher and in construction 26.8 percent (in communications, 13.7 percent lower). However, as for the opportunities to realize the monetary payments on the market, the given detachment of workers is noticeably behind the workers in trade and public dining, in the nonproduction sphere of consumer services to the public as well as in terms of the leaders. This is one of the sources of social tension. We should point out that all the designated employee categories are behind the industrial detachment in terms of the absolute amount of wages [12, pp 150-151]. And within the industrial detachment there is a significant portion of poorly-off workers, although their share here is less than in the other sectors. Thus, according to the data on March 1986, some 26.2 percent of all the employees in the national economy received a wage of less than 120 rubles, in industry the figure was 11.5 percent, in construction 10.1 percent, in transportation 14.2 percent and in communications 29.4 percent [12, p 153]. The workers in the industrial sectors are better provided than the others with sanatoriums, vacation houses, tourist facilities and so forth. Their children are comparatively better provided with places in children's preschool institutions and these institutions themselves in terms of

their facilities and the quality of food surpass the institutions for children of workers in the other sectors.

However, this does not make it possible to judge the urgent social problems of the industrial detachment of workers. At the same time, the prompt solution to the problems for this portion of the workers is "relayed" to all society and has a profound echo in it and this can be both positive as well as seriously negative.

Let us take up certain results of our research.

But initially about the procedural aspect of the research. Its overall conceptual scheme defined the use of the following blocks of empirical indicators: 1) sociodemographic data; 2) socioprofessional position of the respondent; 3) his labor position; 4) the labor situation and 5) social views and self-identification of the respondent.

In the first of the mentioned blocks there were the standard indicators usually employed in sociostructural research. In the second block, along with the traditional characteristics, they used indicators for the socioprofessional status of the respondent at the start of his labor career as well as the social status of the spouse.

The third block defined the degree and form of the actual use of ownership of the means of production by the respondent, his involvement in supervising the organization of labor and the distribution of products and the measure of worker autonomy in the labor process. Here consideration was given to the relationship of the vertical (hierarchical, functional and skill) and horizontal division of labor. (The use of this block of indicators made it possible, in particular, to bring out differences between the varying level of leaders and executors in terms of the degree of their involvement in the organization of production and sociopolitical life as well as the quantitative characteristics of the linkage of the autonomy of labor with the skills and value orientations of the respondents.)

The fourth block was formed on the basis of all the preceding ones and made it possible to analyze the conditions of labor, everyday life, the structure of working and free time, the level of income and material conditions in the life of the respondents. In addition, here also were included questions relating to the new forms of the organization of labor and the moral climate in the collective as well as questions making it possible to disclose the socially and personally significant aspects of the respondent's labor activity, including the possibility of employing the obtained knowledge, working out new procedures and methods, realizing technical creativity, having opportunities for social advancement and so forth.

Finally, the fifth block of indicators made it possible to determine the degree of labor and social activeness of the respondent, his self-identification with his socioprofessional group (stratum), satisfaction with labor, work place and living conditions. The plans of the respondents for the immediate future were also disclosed.²

The research confirmed the significant inner heterogeneity of the industrial detachment of workers but this runs, however, through different "cross-sections" than in the socioclass structure of the entire society. As in the previous research [7-9], a greater degree of closeness was confirmed for workers engaged in labor requiring high skills with specialists than with workers engaged in low-skill labor. The given circumstance concerns not only the "static" but also the "dynamic" characteristics of the respondents.

A comparison of the results of joint research in five socialist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia) carried out by L. Beskid and T. Kolosi, have made it possible to disclose a rather substantial differentiation in the industrial detachment of workers by income and the aggregate index of "several elements of living conditions" (SELC). Due to this, out of the entire mass of industrial workers, the best-off category of specialists stands out and then the remaining (the unskilled workers, skilled workers and "white collar" personnel) differ relatively little. If the overall index of the SELC for all industrial workers is taken as 100, then for the unskilled workers in the designated countries it was from 83 in the GDR to 95 in Bulgaria, for the skilled workers from 95 in Poland to 100 in Bulgaria and Hungary, and for white-collar personnel from 104 in the GDR to 111 in Poland, and for specialists from 110 in Bulgaria to 127 in the GDR. Some 37-42 percent of the unskilled workers considered themselves poor (in the CSSR, 24 percent), as did 24-32 percent of the skilled workers (16 percent in the CSSR), 20-23 percent of the white-collar personnel (13 percent in Poland and 9 percent in the CSSR) and 6-9 percent of the specialists (23 percent in Bulgaria). Thus, one can see both a relative inner homogeneity in the industrial detachment of workers in terms of their living conditions and self-assessments as well as a substantial inner differentiation in it [9, pp 20-22].

Analogous conclusions can be drawn on the basis of other social characteristics of industry workers. One of these is the indicator of social mobility.

Thus, according to the results of research in Gorkiy Oblast, workers employed in physical labor of low skill are close in terms of the indicators of intragenerational mobility (labor career) to nonspecialist white-collar personnel as for both these are substantially higher than for workers employed in highly skilled physical labor and for specialists [6, pp 170-171]. A similar picture was disclosed in comparative research in Hungary and Poland [8, p 78]. According to the data of our research, at the Novokramatorsk Machine Building Plant, some 60 percent of the questioned highly skilled workers and 90 percent of the specialists are socially stable, while the lowly skilled workers and nonspecialist white-collar personnel are significantly more mobile. Up to 70 percent of them changed their social position over the period from the beginning of labor activity to the moment of the poll.

As for the participation of the various worker groups in the management of production and the social affairs of the labor collective, the low-skilled workers and the nonspecialist white-collar personnel, as a rule, did not participate in these activities or resolved not the most essential questions.

The category of foremen is marked by the greatest "dysfunction" of socioprofessional and labor position. These highly skilled workers (over 90 percent have a specialized secondary and higher education) are marked by potential mobility. Over 60 percent of them wish to change their job, many intend to move to another enterprise or even to another national economic sector and one out of four expressed a desire to become a worker. The majority of the foremen expressed dissatisfaction with the content of their labor, and 40 percent assessed their skill above that required for performing their direct duties. Some 25 percent of the respondent foremen did not work in the profession received at school. Foremen more than twice than the engineers participate in settling questions related to production organization, the improvement of working conditions or the introduction of new technology. At present, the foremen are included in the engineer and technical intelligentsia although they differ substantially from the engineers and specialist managers, let alone those who are employed in the industrial sector of science and scientific services. Clearly, we must more adequately define the social status of the foremen as a particular stratum of the industrial detachment of workers as well as their legal status.

Within the research, a cohort analysis of the social characteristics of the studied object was performed. It was disclosed, in particular, that there was a higher level of the "social start" among the younger cohorts while a higher potential mobility is also characteristic of them. Thus, in the youngest cohorts (those who began their labor activities in the 1980s), in contrast to the predecessors, there is a high share of engineers who intend to transfer to being workers.

With an increase in age, the percentage of socially stable employees increases. Among the youth (21-30 years of age), 75.3 percent of the respondents wanted to remain workers, 89.4 percent at the age of 31-40 years, 91.8 percent at 41-50 and 96.2 percent at 51-60 years. Among the older-age workers (51-60 years) no one voiced a desire to become a white-collar worker, only 3.8 percent of the respondents was ready to shift to the engineers and technicians, while among the young (21-30 years), almost one out of five intended to move into the group of engineers and technicians and over 5 percent wanted to become white-collar personnel.

The social stability of the engineers and technicians also increases with age with 87 percent wishing to keep their social position among the youngest, and 91.4 percent in the group of 51-60 years. Only 57 percent of the younger wanted to remain white-collar personnel and all those questioned 41 years and older also did.

An analysis of the plans of life for the respondents showed that a large portion of the questioned workers oriented at changing their labor position would have liked to move to a different section or to a different shop at the same enterprise, while the white-collar personnel wished to move to another enterprise or institution, changing the sphere of the national economy, while the specialists wanted to shift to a different enterprise in the same sector.

A relatively small portion of the respondents linked their plans with taking up a different labor position, having changed their skill. Some 25 percent of the workers of low-skilled labor were engaged in increasing their skills, around 31 percent of the highly skilled, a third of the white-collar personnel and over one-half of the specialists. Thus, the trend is confirmed established by the previous research: with a rise in the educational and skill level, the demand for continuing education rises; at the same time, in keeping with social advancement, the orientation at continuing their education weakens.

The self-assessment of the "sufficiency" or "insufficiency" of the educational and skill level achieved by the respondent served not only as an impetus to continue education and to master new vocational knowledge but also to a significant degree determines the "dysfunction" of his real social status. To the degree that the current state of production (and its industrial sectors are not an exception) does not provide opportunities to realize the worker's intellectual potential and skills, so the socioproduction structure in which he is incorporated can operate in both a functional and dysfunctional manner. If the vocational-skill and educational potential of a worker is adequate to the production-technical and social demands made by society, then there is the ability of the given socioproduction structure to realize its capabilities, and to achieve self-development and self-improvement. Otherwise, it is dysfunctional. In order to assess the state of the industrial detachment of workers and the trend of its development, it is essential to clarify these structures.

It is essential to consider that the dysfunctional structures, in turn, form two subgroups: the first includes workers who consider their skills above the required, while the second includes those who assess their skills

below the required. Analysis has shown that the industrial and construction workers in their majority are in functional structures (see Table 2), in outstripping those employed in the scientific sphere.

Table 2: Distribution of Persons Questioned* for Certain National Economic Sectors and Types of Socioproduction Structures, %

National Economic Sectors	Types of Socioproduction Structures		
	Functional	Dysfunctional	
		Subgroup I	Subgroup II
Industry	72.7	10.2	5.7
Construction	70.9	17.3	3.2
Science	64.3	26.2	0.0
Trade	62.5	22.2	3.4

* Data on respondents finding it difficult to reply not given.

In the functional structures, the level of job satisfaction, as a rule, is higher than in the dysfunctional ones and here the potential mobility of the employees is approximately one-half the amount. The difference between the dysfunctional structures in the subgroups is expressed in the fact that in the first subgroup the neuropsychic stress on the workers in the labor process is 1.4-fold higher than in the second, while physical fatigue, on the contrary, is less. With comparatively less physical stresses, an awareness that one is working not at one's proper place and merits a "better lot" creates obvious mental discomfort in a person.

Of interest is the distribution of the respondents by groups in accord with the vocational education received by them (see Table 3). As we see, the functional structures to a significant degree are filled with workers having a higher and specialized secondary education (49.5 percent) as well as those who received their training directly at the enterprise (40.3 percent). The dysfunctional structures, on the contrary, are basically filled with workers who have undergone training at the enterprise (57.1 percent) in the second subgroup and by those who have completed a higher and specialized secondary school (totaling 47.5 percent) in the first subgroup. The latter are employed, as a rule, in positions and specialties not corresponding to the obtained education.

Table 3: Level of Professional Training of Respondents Comprising Different Socioproduction Structures, %

Types of Socioproduction Structures	Production Training of Respondents						
	Secondary, Vocational-Technical School and Technical School	Trained at Enterprise	General Education School	Technical School	VUZ	Other Forms	No Professional Training
Functional	3.7	30.3	0.7	6.1	43.4	7.7	5.7
Dysfunctional I	4.9	19.5	1.2	8.5	39.0	8.5	15.9
Dysfunctional II	0	57.1	0	0	28.6	7.1	7.1

The designated features are also felt on the continuing of education: in the functional structures, almost two-thirds of the workers (63.4 percent) is improving their skills, while in the dysfunctional ones, less than half (around 47 percent), and a majority here is made up of persons who feel that the level of their training is above the required. Also in the given subgroup are workers employed in manual (unmechanized and little mechanized) and auxiliary labor (over 70 percent of all respondents). In the other structures they comprise a significantly smaller share.

Differing substantially also are the social activeness of the respondents and the degree of their involvement in the management of production and the social affairs of the labor collective. Thus, in the functional structures there is 1.5-fold less respondents who relate negatively to this type of activity than in the dysfunctional ones. At the same time, in terms of the indicators of actual participation in management, the respondents related to the first subgroup of the dysfunctional structures are 3-fold more active than those related to the second and 1.5-fold more than those comprising the functional structures.

With the relatively equal level of per capita income (the largest share is made up with families having a per capita income of around 100 rubles a month), in the dysfunctional structures there is a higher percentage of respondents not satisfied with their material and domestic situation. Some 42.7 percent of those considered in the first subgroup of these structures pointed out that over the last 10 years, their material situation has deteriorated while in the functional subgroup, the share of such replies is 1.5-fold less. The same applies to the indicator of satisfaction with housing conditions.

Thus, the dysfunction of socioproduction structures operates as one of the sources for the dissatisfaction of employees who are in the industrial detachment of workers in terms of their status and, consequently, the possible social tensions within this detachment and this shows its significant social heterogeneity.

To this we must add the interregional and interethnic differences within the given detachment as was pointed out above.

The hypothesis of the industrial detachment of workers as a social community of a new type capable of carrying out an important portion of the consolidating functions in terms of society as a whole has been only partially confirmed in our research. If one speaks about the prospects of studying the given detachments, it is essential to bear in mind not only the original scientific approaches and possibilities of new interpretations for the already existing data, but also substantial changes in the social appearance of the very workers of Soviet industry. These changes have been brought about by major shifts in the social organization of labor and production, in the management of the economy as well as by the democratizing of Soviet society.

Footnotes

1. In addition to the article's authors, I.V. Kazarinova and E.G. Sarovskiy participated in the research.
2. The processing of the obtained primary information was carried out at the Computer Center of the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences by N.I. Rostegayeva.

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13. PRAVDA, 26 May 1989.

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From Monolithicness to Pluralism

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 90 (signed to
press 30 Jan 90) pp 13-19

[Article by Leonid Abramovich Gordon, doctor of historical sciences and laboratory head at the Institute of the International Worker Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Author of the monograph "Che-lovek posle raboty" [Man After Work] (1971, co-author), "Rabochiy klass SSSR: tendentsii i perspektivy sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya" [The USSR Working Class: Trends and Prospects of Socioeconomic Development] (1985, co-author) and "Chto eto bylo" [What This Was] (1989, co-author). Yakov Samuilovich Kapelyush is a candidate of philosophical sciences and department head at the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion. He is the author of the monograph "Obshchestvennoye mneniye o vybornosti na proizvodstve" [Public Opinion on Choice on the Job] (1969) and "Uchrezhdeniya kultury v nebolshom gorode i nase-leniiye" [Cultural Institutions in a Small Town and the Public] (1985, co-author). They are permanent contributors to our journal]

[Text] The importance of public opinion polls, particularly when it is a question of acute, pertinent and fundamental problems, is not exhausted by the obtaining of specific data, their analysis or even the elaboration of recommendations. This is merely the first layer of obtained information, albeit very important. But a thoughtful researcher behind the aggregate of specific replies and judgments can also see substantial traits of mass awareness, detect general trends and trace characteristic features. We would like to present such secondary analysis of the results of the all-Union poll on the results of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies¹ as the basis of an article devoted to the prospects of pluralism in our nation. The timeliness of such a problem of political pluralism and the pertinence of the discussions around this issue (with a clear shortage of factual data) make it completely justified, we feel, to turn to the poll data.

In our times, political pluralism is usually understood as a political life whereby one recognizes the value and actually provides a constant diversity of political life and the opportunity not only to voice different opinions but also to conduct a legal struggle in all stages of the political process and on all levels of power (with the exception of stipulated extraordinary circumstances). Political pluralism presupposes a nonviolent struggle and the adopting of decisions in accord with the legally reinforced rules which, on the one hand, consider the will of the majority and, on the other, the inalienable right of the minority and individuals.² Here and adopting of a legal decision, while obliging all members of society to observe it while it is in legal force, in no way deprives the citizens of the right to criticize, or for an organized struggle to revise or abrogate this decision.

As a result, political administration within the context of civilized pluralism represents a complex system in which the hierarchy of subordination of the inferior levels to the superior ones is combined with an all-encompassing opposition in each of them and with the presence on any level—from the superior bodies of power to the inferior institutions of local administration—of various forms of outright opposition to the groups which at the given moment prevail in this body.

The legal possibility of nonviolent opposition to legal power or the possibility for the political minority to continue its organizational activities and not merely the coexistence of different opinions marks political pluralism from the political systems opposed to it.

Logically, the most consistent opposition to pluralism is found in all sorts of variations of political systems which in their ideal aim at achieving a monolithic, absolute unity. Certainly in these systems one also assumes the presence (and even the use) of different opinions. However, different viewpoints are predominantly voiced prior to the taking of a decision and then a complete unity of action should be ensured. Obedience to the legally adopted decision is insufficient here and any further struggle against it is considered inadmissible. The ideal of monolithic unity is a military organization, where the issued orders are not discussed but rather carried out.

For this reason, a monolithic political system in its complete form is always authoritarian and always gravitates toward a command system. Any attempt to continue an overt organized struggle against the political line of the superior bodies or even against their specific decisions, once these have been adopted and have come into effect, is perceived as a violation of unity in the systems seeking monolithicness. Such terms related to the possibility of such a struggle such as faction, factionalism (let alone opposition and so forth), inevitably have a strictly negative ring.

In other words, the balance of political pluralism and a monolithic political system is a different expression of the balance of democracy and authoritarianism. An

expression perhaps somewhat more schematic and in this regard simplifying the situation, but for precisely this reason isolating the essence of the differences.

In terms of contemporary Soviet society, the opposing of pluralism and monolithicity also has an additional sense. Under the conditions of perestroika, we have virtually no people and groups who are publically against democracy as such. Only the opponents of one or another author turn out to be antidemocrats or supporters of authoritarianism. On the surface of social life there is a struggle going on, so to speak, around different variations and various interpretations of democracy. Clearly this situation greatly impedes an understanding of the real content of the fundamental ideological and political clashes.

The views of the supporters of monolithic unity—whether they are correct or not—are marked by maximum simplicity and clarity. This is no surprise if one recalls that the very organization of political life on the basis of monolithicity is fundamentally simpler than a system of political pluralism. The views of those who are convinced of the advantages of monolithicity stem from two basic notions. The first, from a belief (at times unconscious) that political unity under socialism in any event is a good and that it is always, even under ordinary, unexceptional conditions preferable to a struggle between the sociopolitical forces comprising society. Secondly, out of the conviction that socialist social relations make such unity possible and allow the efficient organization of a political system without opposing subsystems.

Political pluralism, an opposition and freedom of groupings, according to such convictions, are an expression merely of irreconcilable contradictions. In antagonistic societies, the supporters of monolithicity assert, pluralism merely expresses the failings of antagonistic societies and their historical limitation. The establishing of a nonantagonistic social basis leads to the constructing of a system of monolithic political unity in society.

The supporters of monolithic unity, although they do see the negative phenomena of a monolithic society, link them not to the very ideal of unity but rather to the fact that this ideal was embodied in false, incorrect forms. So, one must merely replace the erroneous forms of political organization by correct ones and the achievements of monolithic unity will be fully disclosed. As for political pluralism (that is, a pluralism presupposing the existence of opposition groups and organizations), in their opinion, there is no necessity for them. The supporters of monolithicity assert that unity represents a natural state of socialist society and that a predominant majority of the Soviet people seek unanimity, a monolithic political system in which a pluralism of opinions can be tolerated but not any pluralism of political actions. The appearance of groups seeking extensive political pluralism is explained either by the random confusion of "dissidents" or by the action of external factors.

The arguments of the supporters of political pluralism proceed from more complex notions of the paths of social development and the ideals of social organization. Society, they feel, including a society in which there are no antagonistic contradictions, represents too complex a social organism for the groups, strata and classes comprising it to be able to constantly unite on the basis of a monolithic unity. There is no dispute that such unity is possible in certain extraordinary circumstances, for example, under the conditions of a war or at times of natural disasters, when common danger makes all other differences secondary. However, in a normal situation, the objective interests of people, groups and institutions comprising society are so diverse that it is impossible to bring about their simultaneous and complete satisfaction.

In ordinary instances, monolithic unity ends up as the satisfying of the interests of certain groups and strata at the expense of others. In practice, monolithic unity is an authoritarian rule of the majority.

Certainly, the abstract advantages of pluralism are not embodied in life under any conditions. But at present, as the supporters of pluralism feel, shifts have occurred in the nation making the gradual development of political pluralism possible. The nation is on the threshold of economic reforms, there has been a weakening of the ideological traditions and prejudices forming the basis of the notions about the advantages of monolithicity and historical myths are being destroyed. The entire experience of the nation's social development from the mid-1920s to the mid-1980s in a most obvious manner shows that a monolithic political system does not provide guarantees against abuses. In light of such an understanding of the past as well as the general notion of development whereby fundamental changes are inevitable in the economy and ideology of socialism, the dissemination of the ideas and practical initiatives of political pluralism appears not as just foam, not as the froth of the political current, but as an organic movement.

As can be seen, in the present-day Soviet society, extensive grounds cohabit and struggle for the most diverse, even opposite approaches to the ideals of monolithicity and pluralism, to an assessment of the advisability and reality of the prospects of their embodiment. This dispute can scarcely be resolved merely on a logical and theoretical level. In order to understand the dynamics of the processes engulfing society, specific data are essential. And the role of public opinion polls here is difficult to overestimate. In extrapolating the data obtained on the basis of them into definite logical chains, it is possible to ascertain in what direction development is occurring, for which groups various preferences are characteristic, are these growing stronger or weaker, whose forecasts are being justified in reality and much else.

From the viewpoint of the convinced supporters of pluralism, such a testing has not only cognitive value but

also an immediate practical political one. We propose that in the foreseeable future, the coexistence of pluralistic ideas and the ideas of monolithic unity in our society is inevitable, as this is derived from the differing status of the diverse social groups. In such coexistence the pluralistic structure of social awareness is manifested. But political life should be based on some interaction and compromise of these views. Unfortunately, the attempt to suppress one of the approaches can be a particular instance of such a compromise, so to speak, its zero variation; in practical terms the suppression all the same will not be absolutely complete but it, of course, will produce the worst of the possible solutions. The broader and more reliable our data about how things are in reality and how widespread are the various preferences in society, the higher the probability of achieving an optimum compromise.

The data of a survey conducted from the results of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies are, in our view, very valuable in this regard. First of all, the poll was devoted to a political action which caused enormous interest among a predominant majority of the people as an event of prime importance. The poll was conducted soon after the Congress, when there was already an opportunity to judge it as a whole but the impressions had not yet lost their immediate, vitally pertinent character. Under such conditions the replies to the most concrete questions almost always disclosed—directly or indirectly—the attitude toward much more general problems.

Judging from this poll, the population of our nation has moved far away from the views of monolithicness. Notions of the gravitating of society toward a unity of views ("togetherness," in the expression of certain fans of grass-roots philology) in any event are not confirmed by the facts. In actuality, neither for one out of the two-score questions relating to the Congress of People's Deputies or in one of the main social and cultural groups did complete unanimity or monolithic unity become apparent. Among the most important sociopolitical problems touched upon by the poll, there was not a single one where public opinion was unanimous as it had been in the past. The notorious 99 percent was never encountered in the final data. There were, in truth, several questions where a predominant majority of respondents supported one opinion. Thus, 91 percent of those questioned (from 85 to 94 percent in the various groups) agreed with the proposal of B.N. Yeltsin to shift the Fourth Administration of the USSR Ministry of Health from servicing the upper bureaucrats to treating children; 87 percent (82-94 percent) supported the idea of an immediate cut-back in military expenditures by 10 billion rubles; 83 percent (67-69 percent) approved the election of M.S. Gorbachev as the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But here it is a question of a predominant majority, so to speak, within the coordinates of pluralism and not monolithicness. For even in these instances the share of those not agreeing does not come down to a negligibly small amount as the dissidents

at present under any conditions comprise (speaking in round terms) at least 10-15 percent.

The nonmonolithic nature of the current prevailing majority is obvious because at one time it itself showed dissidence and disagreement with the opinions prevailing in the power structures. Indicative in this regard is the attitude toward the statements of Academician A.D. Sakharov on the question of the Afghan War. As is known, the views of A.D. Sakharov were disapproved of by a marked majority of the people's deputies. The television camera made obvious the irritation which his words about events in Afghanistan caused in virtually all participants of the morning session of the Congress on 2 June 1989. The audience almost did not let the academician speak. A majority of those present, including certain party and state leaders, gave a standing ovation to the persons who had allowed themselves to use the word "disgrace" against A.D. Sakharov, and this was purportedly on behalf of the people and the voters.

At the same time, the June poll just as definitely showed that a majority of the respondents held a completely different persuasion. Those questioned were asked to assess the assertion of the academician that it was criminal to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan and that the war itself was criminal. These words were considered completely correct by 55 percent and correct basically by 18 percent of those replying, that is, by a total of 73 percent of their total number, or from 64 to 86 percent for the various categories. This discrepancy, let us hope, will help certain deputies get rid of their naive confidence that any statement by them expresses the will of the voters, the working class, the workers and the people as a whole. It is important for us to draw attention to such a striking discrepancy because it is a manifestation of the specific forms of the pluralism of mass awareness expressed in the heterogeneity of public opinion on the various levels of the sociopolitical structure.

Moreover, it must be recognized that the instances of the coinciding of views for a predominant majority of the respondents under present-day conditions are more the exception than the rule. The rule is that for almost all substantial questions of social life, the majority is not the predominant one but the minority almost always encompasses a significant portion of the public. Thus, in the answers to the main questions of the survey under discussion, the largest groups adhering to a single opinion usually do not comprise over 40-60 percent of those questioned, while the minority groups include 20-30 and even 40 percent. The departure of mass awareness from monolithicness here is manifested in a most visible form.

But probably the materials of the June 1989 poll represent even more persuasive proof of what ideals of the political system—monolithicness or pluralism—to a large degree correspond to the real trends of social development. These materials, in addition to assessing the specific events of the Congress, contain data making it possible to judge the attitude of the public to the very

principles of the structuring of different variations of political organization as well as to the symbols to which such variations are linked. And it is particularly striking that the replies to such generalized questions provide a clear notion of the development dynamics of mass consciousness from a universal recognition of the ideas of monolithichness to the gradual adoption of the values of political pluralism and developed democracy.

From this viewpoint it is interesting to examine the distribution of replies to questions, in the first place, of where supreme power should be concentrated, secondly, how one should relate to differences of opinion and, thirdly, in what manner is it better to take decisions with the presence of differences. The first of these questions provides an opportunity to ascertain who, in the opinion of the respondents, should exercise real supreme power in our society—the party bodies, the government, the Congress of People's Deputies or the Supreme Soviet. In considering historical experience, the customary terminology and actual practice of our social life, it would be logical to consider that a recognition of the advisability of concentrating supreme power in the hands of the party leadership or the government expresses a clear or subconscious gravitation toward maintaining the monolithic political organization which is traditional for us. Conversely, the opinion of the need to transfer supreme power to the representative bodies elected by all the people—to the Congress of People's Deputies or to the Supreme Soviet, obviously bespeaks a rejection of the ideals of monolithichness. For this reason, it is extremely essential that the answers to the given questions are reliable. Some 83 percent of those questioned (from 61 to 93 percent in the various categories) were certain that supreme power should be turned over to the Congress of People's Deputies or to the Supreme Soviet and to their bodies; only 13 percent (from 9 to 19 percent) felt that superior power should remain with the party bodies and the government. Seemingly, a predominant portion of the people, including all the strata and groups comprising it, does not share the ideals and main principles of the previous political organization. In combination with the above-given data, this makes it possible to assert that mass awareness has already abandoned a recognition of monolithichness as the ideal of political organization.

The abandoning of monolithichness has been accompanied by an obvious shift of this awareness toward the adopting of values and principles of political pluralism or at least a pluralism of political opinions. This shift is clearly apparent in the answers to the question about the attitude toward differences of opinion in the higher political bodies, in particular, in the Congress of People's Deputies. One-half of those questioned (from 35 to 62 percent of the various groups) was convinced that differences of opinion are beneficial in political life and that they help to elaborate correct decisions. Around one-third (from 22 percent to 40 percent) felt that differences of opinion are natural and inevitable and that if they may not bring direct benefit, in any event they do not

prevent a normal course of political life. Only an insignificant minority of 8 percent (from 2 to 17 percent of the various categories) still feels that in any instance differences of opinion are harmful.

Finally, the mass awareness of a rather significant portion of society has moved even further, to an understanding that true pluralism is not limited by recognition of the admissibility or even the desirability of the heterodox. Developed democracy and extensive political pluralism (in contrast to a pluralism of opinions in the literal sense) proceeds from the view that an essential element in the democratic organization of social life is observing the rights and interests of not only the majority but also the minority. Compromise comprises the most important instrument of practical policy under the conditions of pluralism, and without recognition of its role no real democracy is possible. Hence, the importance of the replies to the question of under what conditions will the decisions of the supreme powers be best: if they are totally determined by the position of the majority or if in adopting them to a definite degree the viewpoint of the minority is also considered. The first position still prevails as 54 percent of those questioned (from 33 to 63 percent) identified the best decisions unconditionally with the will of the majority. However, the supporters of compromise comprise a very marked portion of society as 32 percent of those questioned (from 24 to 50 percent of the various groups) pointed to the necessity of considering the opinion of the minority.

As a whole, the distribution of replies to the questions concerning the centers of power, on the benefit or harm of differences of opinion, or on the role of the majority and minority in decision-taking forms such a consistent and logical ratio that it would be hard to consider it random. At present (more accurately in June 1989), an absolute majority of the population no longer accepted the former political symbols which designated the system of monolithic power. For now, this absolute majority has still not switched unconditionally to the values of political pluralism. But approximately one-half of society recognizes the benefit of differences of opinion and a pluralism of opinions, although around one-third has reached the point of accepting the political benefit of compromise. Such a trend is obvious.

The probability of the development of this trend in the foreseeable future is confirmed by the fact that it is manifested with particular intensity in those strata to which the future belongs. The supporters of political pluralism are usually more numerous the larger the size of the city where the persons questioned live, the higher their education, skill level and political activeness and the younger they are. While as an average, 83 percent of the public favored the concentration of supreme power in the representative institutions, 50 percent indicated the benefit of differences of opinion and 32 percent pointed to the necessity of compromises, among the inhabitants of large cities and specialists with a higher education, their share is, respectively, 88-93 percent, 60-64 percent and 45-48 percent.

Of course, mass awareness depends not only upon educational level and urbanization. The failure of perestroika and even simply an extended economic crisis can check for a long time to come the process occurring in it now and lead, if not to a new predominance of the ideals of monolithicism, then to the spread of the ideology of populism with its characteristic simultaneous veneration of the values of authoritarianism, nationalism and vulgar egalitarianism.

But the fact that democratic awareness is growing in our society and that at present development is moving in this direction can scarcely be refuted. There is no guarantee for the obligatory success of this trend. But opportunities exist for its further development. Whether they are embodied in life depends upon each of us, upon our determination and courage, upon our readiness to carry out our duty and, finally, upon the degree of our circumspection and reasonability.

Footnotes

1. The poll was conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion in the first few days after the Congress (11-14 June 1989). In accord with the sampling which is representative for the population of our country, 2,100 persons were polled from 18 years and over in 47 population points, including in 18 republic, kray and oblast centers, 13 peripheral towns and 16 rural rayons.

2. The legally ordered nonviolent nature of political struggle and the adopting of decisions marks civilized pluralism from feudal atomism and anarchy. Formally speaking, in the latter instances the political orders are also pluralistic. But this is a lawless, violent pluralism.

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How to Study a Collective Contract

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[Text] Figures, as is known, are a stubborn thing. VESTNIK STATISTIKI in 1984 announced that the brigades included 71.7 percent of all the industrial workers, and here in 65.6 percent of the cases their labor was assessed according to the end result [2].

Is this a little or a lot? Seemingly, it is a simple question but it does not have an answer. It turns out that objective data do not always reflect the qualitative state of the studied subject. In the given instances, sociological polls are much more eloquent and they show: collective forms of labor, with rare exceptions, are being introduced

formally without any concern for the main thing, the establishing of elementary order in the organization of labor.

In 1985-1986, the AUCCTU Scientific Center conducted research at more than 20 enterprises in the nation (around 5,000 persons were polled, including 3,000 workers). The scientists established that only 48 percent of the respondents of those who had converted to the new method of work agreed with the judgment: "Our collective is working under a unified schedule, it receives remuneration for the end result and distributes it according to the LPC (Labor Participation Coefficient)." Some 31.6 percent replied: "Our brigade operates under a single schedule, but remuneration is distributed in accord with the categories and time worked." In formal terms, we are members of the brigade—the workers told the scientists—but actually we are engaged in separate types of labor, and we receive our wages according to their results." Some 19.3 percent of the persons questioned felt this way. Thus, the number of those who actually worked in brigades was significantly less than we were informed by VESTNIK STATISTIKI.

Of course, from the given example we must not draw the categorical conclusion that polls always and everywhere provide more reliable and profound information than the information of the statistical collections. We would merely like to emphasize two aspects. In the first place, any figure, any indicator, including that obtained as a result of a poll, represent information which should be analyzed in the corresponding manner. Secondly, it is possible to gain a complete picture of what is occurring only in using both the objective (statistical) and subjective (poll) information. Moreover, there are situations when only an intelligently conducted poll makes it possible to establish the truth.

It was not our task to acquaint the reader with the theoretical notions of the collective forms of labor or generalize the actual experience of its introduction. There is extensive literature on these questions. Here rather it was a matter chiefly of the methods and techniques of sociological research. But let us point out that the poll method and an analysis of the collective information are closely dependent upon the theoretical, informative notions about the processes being studied. Unfortunately, there still are many superficial and purely illustrative studies made and these disclose little in the mechanism of collective labor. The reason is the insufficiently profound analysis of the essence of the socioeconomic processes occurring in the nation and the shortage of professionally trained researchers.

It is impossible to guarantee a high quality and reliability of the information, if definite rules are not observed. A different formulating of what is seemingly the same question changes its meaning into the opposite. It would be possible to give many examples but let us take up what is closest to us in subject. This involves the very foundation, that is, a definition of what is a collective. In one study the question may be formulated thus: "When

you speak about your collective, whom do you have in mind primarily?" A predominant majority (95 percent) replied: "Primarily one's brigade and all of those who work nearby." Just what is this? Weighty arguments in favor of the opinion of those who feel that one can speak about a collective only where there are personal contacts between the people? We decided to ask an additional question for the sake of a control: "Do you feel our socialist society to be collectivist?" And again, in a majority of instances, there were affirmative answers. Does this mean that the answers to the second question contradict the first? In no way. The concept of "collectivism" in either instance reflects different phenomena. In the first, the question recorded the action of a sociopsychological mechanism of interpersonal interaction as an important component of collectivism. In the second, chiefly the normative aspect of the awareness of people was measured, that is, values which are recognized as positive by society. To such standard qualities which in essence reflect generally accepted values and ideals are such things as "the carrying out of duty," "concern for social good" and so forth. The mechanism of forming such forms is substantially different than elaborating the rules of conduct in a small group.

The structure of the questionnaire or interview blank depends upon the goal which the researcher has set for himself, as well as upon the nature of that phenomenon which is to be studied. The logic of constructing the questionnaire which considers these aspects is concretized in the particular choice of question blocks. A portion of these should aid in elucidating the degree that the respondent is informed about the phenomenon being studied. Some clarify the structure, form and content of the examined phenomenon. Others are related to elucidating the attitude of the respondents to this phenomenon, the prospects of its development and the degree of effectiveness. Then follow questions which help to understand the factors impeding the successful introduction and development of the studied phenomenon or, if it is a question of negative consequences, the methods of eliminating these. Finally, the "certification" data of the person being questioned (sex, age, education, position, profession, skill level and place of employment) and the object of research (region, city, sector, type of production or the nature of labor).

Depending upon the specific goal of the poll, it is possible to analyze individual subsystems or elements as well as the relationships arising between them. In terms of the object "collective forms of labor" one speaks about such subsystems as: 1) organizational aspects, including economic, technological and legal; 2) incentives; 3) relationships; 4) self-management.

In organizing a poll it is essential to consider the following circumstances: 1) at what stage is the introduction of the collective forms of labor; 2) under what conditions (organizational, economic, psychological and

so forth) is it being carried out; 3) what is the sociodemographic, professional group which is the object of the poll. All these factors have a significant influence on the nature of the poll.

For instance, at an enterprise they are just planning a conversion to new forms of operation. Then the aim of the poll is to elucidate the degree of psychological readiness for the innovation among the various groups of workers: workers, ITR [engineer and technical personnel] and leaders and the level of their information about just what is the collective form of labor. If the poll is taken after its introduction, then the emphasis could be put on bringing out the factors contributing to or impeding the effective use of this innovation.

The content of the poll can differ substantially depending upon whether the introduction is being carried out, for instance, in a brigade of assembly workers as here the labor operations are technologically interrelated, or in a brigade of machine tool operators with predominantly individual work.

The nature of the poll also depends upon the composition of persons being questioned. It is one thing if the respondents are direct participants in the innovation and feel its results and quite something else when they are acting as experts. Certainly, in and of itself participation in some undertaking still does not mean its proof and understanding and correct perception. "From the facts that you live and run your affairs, that you produce children and products, exchange products is formed the objectively necessary chain of events, the chain of development, independent of your social awareness and not ever completely in comfort by it" [1]. The information obtained in the first instance explains rather the sociological response to what is happening and this does not exclude, however, the possibility of collecting effective proposals, advice and requests. Even when the response of the respondents is not completely adequate to the situation, the organizer of the poll should not think that time has been wasted. The inadequacy of the worker responses is an indicator of certain problems or errors. It is essential to investigate the situation and take measures which would eliminate the psychological stress of people. Pressure of violation of the principle of voluntariness produced, as a rule, the reverse effect. In similar instances it is even more important than in ordinary instances to understand all the nuances of the behavior of people and the latent motives of their actions.

A poll of specialists or experts is based on different principles. In the first place, there are naturally fewer experts than ordinary participants in the experiments. It is completely possible that even on the scale of a region or a sector, there will just be an isolated few. Correspondingly, there is a change in the principle of selecting the persons to be questioned. Secondly, the aim of the poll is to ascertain their opinion on the most important aspects which are capable qualitatively of altering the situation. This is a priceless and often the unique source of information and it must be used very carefully. The

questions of the questionnaire should be posed professionally, while the replies and proposals from the experts should be backed up as soundly as possible. Here open-ended questions are frequently used.

One of the most widespread errors in the questionnaires is the desire to present the replies obtained to "head-on" questions in the form of complete knowledge. For example, affirmative replies to the question "Do you feel that the democratization of our society contributes to the development of the collective forms of labor based on true cost accounting?" in individual instances bespeak the social optimism of the respondents and in others, they involve serious changes in the system of management and control.

Let us examine specific formulations of the questionnaire questions in order to illustrate those procedural means by which the content tasks of the research are carried out. As the basis let us take the above-indicated structure of the questionnaire consisting of four sub-systems.

Our questionnaire began with questions concerning the degree to which the respondent was informed of the essence of the question. The aim was to establish the "information field" of the person being questioned in order to introduce, if need be, the corresponding corrections in interpreting the replies. The statement "I, of course, do not know but I think that the situation is so and so" cannot be understood literally, although it rather accurately characterizes the person's method of thinking. Certainly, people at times manage to give assessments even to those phenomena about which they have only the most approximate notion. In some instances it is possible to be satisfied with such knowledge by the respondents about the subject while in others it is essential to accurately measure the degree of their information.

In setting the question about the brigade contract, it is essential to consider the vocabulary of the respondent. At present, for example, one can scarcely formulate the question in the following manner: "Are you familiar with the content of the collective forms of labor?" At present, everyone knows something or has heard something about them. Some 10-15 years ago, the collective forms of labor were uniformly associated with a brigade contract. However, the situation has changed and they have begun speaking about the use of collective forms of labor on the level of the sector, the shop and then the enterprise as a whole. Any strengthening of cost accounting principles was perceived without fail as a strengthening of the collective principles of labor. For this reason, it is essential to isolate the key word, that is, the term which rather precisely and uniformly fixes the studied phenomenon and serves as its reliable feature. This can be "BFOT" (brigade form of the organization of labor), "cost accounting," "contract," "lease" and so forth.

In 1984, many enterprises converted to the normative method of forming the incentive fund and this was termed a "wide-scale economic experiment." One of its

distinguishing features was the strengthening of the collective, cost accounting principles. Sociologists decided to ascertain the level to which the workers and ITR were informed of this. The main question was formulated as follows: "Do you have any notion of the sense of the economic experiment being carried out at your enterprise?" The percentage distributions to the three variations of the replies are given in Table 1.

Table 1: Level of Information About Economic Experiment, %

Reply-Judgments	Workers	ITR and White-Collar Personnel
Yes, I have a rather full notion	43.4	76.6
I, of course, have heard about the experiment but I still have a poor notion of what is its purpose	43.0	20.7
Hard to answer	13.6	2.7

The reader will recognize here without any difficulty an ordinary filtering question. It is asked in the aim of ascertaining the degree to which the person being questioned is informed of a concrete problem. The level of information often operates as a rather accurate indicator of the practical introduction of new forms of labor and in certain instances also the degree of their effectiveness. A seemingly simple question discloses very interesting details. Seemingly, the worker or ITR has merely to confirm whether he knows something about the experiment or not. The question is straightforward. But in actuality, we are also measuring the course of introducing the innovation and the involvement of the regular workers in it. The logic is simple: if he is not involved, then he does not know. It turned out that 18 months after the transition of the enterprise to the new operating conditions, over one-half of the workers and a fifth of the ITR had a very hazy notion of the experiment. Thus, if they know little it means that it is being poorly introduced. Here there are errors by the organizers. The filtering question is a purely instrumental function. We no longer turn to the "no-knows" with other, informative questions.

For clarifying the degree of information and the quality of knowledge about the new forms of labor, it is possible to employ the following procedures. The first is to ask about individual traits of the innovation process which to the strongest degree characterize its purpose. For example, a worker is little informed as to the indicators which are responsible for the brigade receiving wages and bonuses. What does this show? Without additional information, it is virtually impossible to provide a correct answer. There must be questions, for instance, of the following sort: "Do you know the indicators the fulfillment of which means wages and bonuses for the brigade?" (Variations of answers: "Yes, I know them well," "I know them approximately" and "No, I do not

know"); "Do you always precisely know the plan quota in the range and volume set for your brigade for the month?" ("I always know precisely," "I know approximately but not precisely," "Most often I do not know"); "If you know the brigade's plan quota, can you say what the brigade's wage fund (in rubles) will be for carrying out this quota?" (Yes, I can say precisely," "I can say only tentatively" and "I cannot say what the brigade's wage fund will be").

Here is what our experience has shown. Typical are situations when a precise knowledge of the plan quota in terms of product range does not mean the same precise knowledge of other aspects such as cost in rubles or the amount of future earnings. Thus, in the poll under discussion, up to one-half of the workers showed good familiarity with the plan quotas in terms of product range but only 25 percent were able to point to the "weight" of this quota in rubles and this characterizes the quality of the collective contract.

At times, the level of information depends not upon the person but upon the information source. In order to establish this, we ask the question: "If you are acquainted with the new form of work (indicate precisely which), then what was the source of this?" The possible channels of information served as the "sources" including the press, courses of political education and economic studies, speeches by leaders, consultations of specialists, reference procedural materials and talks with comrades on the job. It must be considered that if the knowledge about the innovation had a special nature and required a familiarization with technical details and the correspondent pointed to television, radio or discussions with comrades, then the quality of his informativeness was very low.

For verification, it is possible to ask the respondent to indicate a list of some provisions of the document or the

standards or give a precise indicator characterizing the activities of the collective. Then this is correlated with the really existing figures. Such a procedure is a difficult test and more often the respondents do not pass it. But if we are to speak seriously about the economic intelligence of the masses or the knowledge of the economic principles of production without which any perestroyka is impossible, then our demands will not seem so severe. Unfortunately, such indicators as the amount of the wage and material incentive fund and planned profit cannot be given even by the ITR and white-collar personnel, let alone the workers. As a rule, they are poorly acquainted with the provisions and specific figures of the collective contract and the conditions of the socialist competition.

It would be an impermissible oversimplification to see the reason for the insufficient level of information solely in the poor level of training and propaganda work at the enterprise, although this does occur. The main thing is the absence of interest in such knowledge for oneself personally. For this reason, for instance, in the cooperatives the level of information in the sphere of the concrete economy is very high. It is impossible otherwise if you consider yourself to be the master of production.

In speaking about the sociological assessment of the new form of work, it is essential to bear in mind three circumstances as a minimum: 1) the principles on which it is based; 2) the sequence of implementing these principles in the actual introduction; 3) the time factor (since one can scarcely count on an instantaneous change in the methods of management). Such a scheme helps encompass the essence of the matter and provides a general understanding of the problem and is easily translated into a question form. For example, an assessment of an economic experiment can be obtained in using the following statement: "Below opinions are given on the economic experiment and please mark which of these you agree with" (Table 2).

Table 2: Assessment of Principles of Experiment and Sequence of Their Introduction in Practice, %

Answer-Judgments	Workers	ITR and White-Collar Personnel	Leaders
The principles which were the basis of the experiment make it possible to interest people better and more fully in achieving high results	16.7	18.7	13.9
The principles themselves are good but require great tenacity in their implementation and actual introduction	23.6	24.8	31.0
Experiment principles require further development and deepening	12.6	14.2	20.3
Essential to improve both principles of experiment and the practice of their introduction	14.1	19.7	19.3
Still too early to judge effectiveness of principles and practice of introducing experiment	33.0	22.6	15.5

As we see, public opinion as a whole rather precisely reflected the economic situation in those years. The broad-scale experiment undoubtedly was a step ahead on the path to an efficient management mechanism, but: in the first place, the principles on which it was based were

carried out without sufficient consistency and with deviations and violations; secondly, not all of the necessary conditions were realized for implementing them; thirdly, the principles themselves were not sufficiently radical and were limited to half-measures and for this reason

were unable to bring about an intensification of social production. This was the opinion of the specialists [3] and it was confirmed by practice as only 31.3 percent of the enterprise leaders pointed out that an opportunity had appeared for the manifesting of independence, initiative and responsibility. A majority felt that the rights of management had remained as before.

It is better to take a differentiated approach to studying the effectiveness of the collective contract, that is: to ask for an assessment of not all but rather the most important elements and indicators of labor. In this instance, as a rule, a tabular form is obtained for the placement of the questions with the indicators being given in the subject and in the predicate the scale characterizing the degree and types of effect (Table 3).

Table 3: Replies to Question "What Do You Feel, What Indicators in the Operation of Your Brigade Have Changed in Converting to the Collective Form of Wages?", %

Indicators	Significantly Aided	Aided But Not Significantly	No, Did Not Aid	Hard to Answer
Rise in labor productivity	44.8	27.2	10.5	17.5
Savings of raw products and materials	27.9	32.5	19.7	19.9
Mastery of related professions	41.4	27.0	17.0	14.6
Strengthening of friendship and mutual aid	44.9	26.4	12.3	16.4
Strengthening of discipline	52.9	24.7	8.7	13.7

The tables save space and they provide the possibility of a visual comparison of the indicators. However, they must not be overdone as they encumber the questionnaire and make it difficult to understand. Often a portion of the positions in the questionnaire are skipped by the respondents due to a lack of attention or they select those which are easier for them to answer.

But is it at all worth asking workers about changes in labor productivity, the saving of materials or combining jobs if it is possible to learn about this from objective data? On this issue the following must be said. In the first place, as we are already certain, statistics does not always provide an objective picture. Secondly, polls make it possible to obtain information rather quickly and for different vocational groups. Most importantly, the poll makes it possible to disclose the conscious attitude of the worker to the occurring changes. You will agree that there is a difference in the situations: one when the person virtually gives no thought to his actions and operates in a way automatically, obeying circumstances and another, when his conscience is fixed on the subject, forcing concentration on the main thing and this is precisely what happens in answering the questions of the questionnaire.

It would be wrong to overlook the economic indicators, for example, the rise in labor productivity or the drop in labor intensiveness. A comparison of the objective indicators and the subjective assessments which examine the same process from different sides raises the soundness of the information and sketches in a more complete picture. Having compared the economic indicators for the growth of labor productivity with the evaluation judgments, in the full sense of the word one can "calculate" just what a statement is worth like "the changeover to new forms of work has substantially raised..." or "raised but not substantially."

Moreover, in conducting regular polls and comparing their results with the statistical data, we improve the

measuring tool (the questionnaire). When we do not like a momentary photograph of the social situation, it is essential to construct dynamic series by comparing the opinion of the correspondents over certain intervals of time. But the questionnaire in this instance should be carried out using the same method and the same sampling mass. However, the subjective evaluations are a tricky thing. They reflect the social criteria of what at the given moment is considered normal or abnormal, acceptable or unacceptable. For this reason, in comparing the data it is essential to make an adjustment for possible changes in social awareness. People become more critical of shortcomings at an enterprise and what they previously overlooked or tolerated they now condemn openly.

On the other hand, the positive shifts which have occurred as a result of general Union measures can also be ascribed to local factors. For example, the campaign to strengthen public discipline in 1984-1985 produced results but was perceived as the result of the economic experiment and the introduction of the brigade forms of work. Since sociologists are interested in the "net" effect measured without outside influences, a single comparison over time is not enough. There must also be a spatial breakdown. It would be a good thing to compare different shops and sections, let us say those where collective forms of labor have been introduced and where this did not occur. The collectives which were not touched by the innovations would be called the control groups and the experimental ones could be compared with them.

Comparison with an ideal is yet another facet of the sociological poll. The socioeconomic innovations exist in order to create broader opportunities for the worker to increase labor efficiency, raise skills and participate in management. An example of an assessment of the altered situation from the viewpoint of the ideal would be the following formulation of the question: "Do you feel, in the course of the experiment, all the necessary conditions have been established for the effective work of your

collective?" The answers from the workers to the given question were distributed in the following manner (Table 4).

Table 4: Assessment of Conditions for Efficient Work, %

Reply-Judgments	Workers
Yes, all conditions have been created	9.8
Certain have been created, but not all	36.4
Virtually no new favorable conditions have been created	35.9
Conditions for efficient work have not improved and in some regards even deteriorated	10.4
Hard to answer	7.5

Let us point out that the introduction of collective forms of labor is a multifactor process and it is influenced by the economic-technical, social, psychological and organizational conditions at the enterprise. What in this polygon is the main thing and which of the factors—internal or external—provides the greatest resistance to successful introduction? The main difficulty is certainly

not in the formulating of the question itself as it can sound rather simple, for example: "What, in your opinion, impedes the further development and deepening of the brigade form of the organization of labor and wages?" The entire difficulty is in the correct choice of cover answers or the hints for the answer. The best solution is the listing of variations. The respondent is offered an opportunity to reply to more than one judgment since, and this is completely logical, the resistance factors more often are combined than they would reciprocally exclude one another. In selecting the answers it is essential to consider the contradictions which are concealed from the eye. The "menu" of opposing factors should be: 1) as complete as possible but should not be long, convenient for perception and rather compact; 2) generalized and at the same time reflecting the specific features of concrete production; 3) indicating not superficial but rather the deep strata of the phenomenon and which specialists are capable of assessing. Let us give an example of the possible cover answers to the question formulated above. This was proposed to the ITR and white-collar personnel at the enterprises working under the conditions (see Table 5).

Table 5: Factors Impeding Development of Brigade Form of Labor, %

Reply-Judgments	ITR and White-Collar Personnel
Planned limited wage fund of enterprise workers which does not grow proportionally to the amount of work carried out by brigades	15.5
System of plan and reporting indicators for enterprise operations not coinciding with conditions and indicators for work of brigades on full cost accounting	6.4
Poor material incentives for ITR and management workers in working to introduce BFOT	21.5
Ignorance and miscomprehension of brigade cost accounting by many leaders of sections, shops	8.8
Under conditions of experiments, there are no conditions impeding development of brigade form of organization of labor and wages	7.7
Hard to answer	40.1

The figures indicate that for many ITR and white-collar personnel, the question as a whole was rather difficult. Above all, this was expressed in the fact that 40 percent of them generally found it difficult to answer anything or to point to a specific reason for the inhibiting of the BFOT. It is indicative that the ITR pointed most often to their poor material interest in working under the new conditions and this is an important factor of resistance. More rarely, these questions pointed precisely to the factor which, in the opinion of the scientists, was the main one, that is, the absence of a direct linkage between the results of the brigade's work and the enterprise wage fund (FZP). The first two reply-judgments were aimed at disclosing precisely this factor: one of them characterized the external circumstances and the desire of the ministry to fit the enterprise FZP to the existing number of personnel, while the other showed the absence of internal plant cost accounting.

If the above-proposed list is difficult to understand (particularly for regular workers), then the cover answer can be formulated more simply: 1) shortcomings of material-technical supply; 2) absence of a contract

clearly formulating the obligations of the sides: brigade workers and administration; 3) absence of proper accounting for results of labor and expenditures of raw products, materials and so forth; 4) shortcomings in the normative base (the standards of labor intensity, output and so forth); 5) the authoritarian style of leadership impeding the development of self-management and self-organization of the collective: a) "from above," that is, externally in relation to the collective, b) "within" or on the part of one's own leader; 6) conflict, poor relations in the collective and so forth.

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Social Justice in Consumption and Its Stereotypes
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[Article by Marina Vladimirovna Pokrovskaya, candidate of economic sciences, senior science associate at the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. She is the author of the monograph "Obshcheye i osobennoye v obraze zhizni sotsialnykh grupp sovetskogo obshchestva" [The General and Particular in the Way of Life in Social Groups of Soviet Society] (1987, co-author) and "Sotsialnaya sfera: preobrazovaniye usloviy truda in byta" [The Social Sphere: Transformation of Working and Living Conditions] (1988, co-author). She has appeared in our journal with a review (No 1, 1980)]

[Text] Social justice is a vast and diverse concept and for this reason the interest shown in it by scientists in various areas is understandable. Thus, the problems of the justice and equality of citizens in the observance of the standards of socialist legality and the socialist community comprise the subject of legal science while the observance of justice in the distribution of income, the consumption of material goods and services is the age-old subject of economic science. It has developed historically this way. However, at present this problem has been raised so acutely in our society that in the debates related to it scientists of various areas are voicing their views actively, including philosophers, economists, lawyers, historians and sociologists.

In addition to this, the flagrant instances of deviations from the principles of social justice discovered in the light of glasnost have focused the attention of current affairs writers and the readers have been inundated with a flood of articles on once prohibited subjects from the area of distribution and consumption: the shortage, lines, increased prices, flagrant manifestations of social injustice and other unpleasantnesses in our daily life. In truth, the focus of the problem frequently gives way to a depth of analysis, when the researcher restricts himself to a statement of fact, leaving the causes unexplained.

Establishing the notion of social justice as a criterion for decision taking in the area of social policy represents important research which should be not only theoretically analyzed but also correlated with the results of empirical sociological research. In this context, below the issue is raised of social justice in its second, that is economic, aspect, but also basically on an analysis of the stereotypes existing in public opinion or its perception.

How is social justice interpreted in the sphere of distribution and consumption by scientists? It must be said that in our social thought there are no substantial distinctions over the questions of the distribution of income. Everything comes down to the fact that one of the main tasks in improving the distribution mechanisms is to increase the differentiation of wages as an incentive for more effective labor.

But what is the opinion of the public on this question? A well known philosopher, for example, has asserted on the pages of a popular weekly that the positions of the scientists and a predominant majority of Soviet people on the necessity of eliminating the far-reaching wage leveling and the introduction of a sound differentiation of income coincide [1]. On the other hand, an equally well known economist, in analyzing letters and replies to his newspaper article in which he favored an unlimited differentiation of earnings and income, arrived at a conclusion which amazed him: "A majority of the authors...demanded the observance of equality in the income of the population as a guarantee of the spiritual purity of the people" [2].

We will not argue as to who of them is right, but rather let us turn to the materials of a sociological poll. Particularly as the author himself of the newspaper material is convinced that "the problem of the measure of remuneration for labor cannot be resolved by an arithmetically scrupulous comparison of the results of their labor, but rather requires the establishing of social justice for such gaps, including on the basis of considering public opinion" [ibid.]. The questionnaire of the all-Union sociological study on the way of life of the Soviet people¹ contained questions which requested that the persons answering indicate the amount of their wage and assess how just it was, if a comparison was made with the earnings of other people in the same specialty, and indicate the amount of the wage which, in the opinion of the person being questioned, he should have received for his labor contribution, as well as the level of income needed to satisfy needs within reasonable limits. The statistical processing and analysis of the opinion of people on the designated questions showed that, in the first place, the differentiation of the desired wage as a whole was below the differentiation of the real wage; secondly, the nature of the distribution of the former differs from the distribution of the latter toward a greater right-handed skewing² and thirdly, a factor influencing the amount of these differences is the assessment of the justice-injustice of the real earnings with a very low impact of the assessments of work at full force, with high quality and so forth (see Table 1).

Table 1: Relationship of Average Values of Real and Desired Wages With Assessment of Justice of Wage (in rubles)

Assessment of Justice of Remuneration for Labor	Average Monthly Wage		Difference Between Real and Desired, % of Real
	Real	Desired	
Just	181	214	18
Somewhat just	156	212	36
Significantly less than just	141	217	54

In other words, people want to receive more than they do receive, in being guided not so much by objective assessments of their output on the job as by considerations of justice-injustice interpreted, obviously, one-sidedly. Finally and fourthly, the relative difference between the real and desired wage as an average did not exceed one-third of the actual earnings, although this amount varied depending upon education, the amount of real wages and the assessment of the justice of the current wage. On the other hand, there are grounds to feel that the very assessment of the justice of remuneration influences labor intensity (see Table 2).

Table 2: Relationship of Assessments of Justice of Remuneration for Labor With Assessment of the Influence of Its Amount on Labor Intensity, %

Assessments of Justice of Remuneration for Labor	Replies to Question: "Do Wages Impel You to Work at Full Strength?"	
	Does Not or To Small Degree	Does to Significant Degree
Significantly less than just	48	38
Somewhat less than just	38	50
Just	29	59

The data of all-Union research made it possible to make one other important comparison from the viewpoint of the designated subject, that is, the average income actually earned per family member and that level of average income which would make it possible, in the opinion of the person being questioned, to fully satisfy the family's needs. Comparisons of the distribution of the real level of average per capita income with the desired, with the exception of the first two patterns analogous to the designated in terms of wages, disclosed, in the first place, substantial discrepancies in the real and desired earnings, differences in differentiation as was shown by the amount of the variation coefficient and, secondly, the relatively large amount of these differences reaching one-half of the average per capita family income (see Table 3).

Table 3: Basic Statistical Characteristics of Distributions of Real and Desired Standard of Living Indicators

Indicators	Statistical Characteristics		
	Mean Arithmetic (rubles)	Standard Deviation	Coefficient of Variation (%)
Real wages	165	73.4	44.5
Desired wages	211	92.2	43.2
Average income per family member	104	62.6	60.2
Desired average income	146	68.5	46.9

Thus, it can be stated that at present two stereotypes have been formed for the social justice of distribution. One defended by many scientists and management workers is the strengthening of the differentiation of

earnings and income as a means of encouraging material self-interest in the quality and result of one's labor. The other characteristic of a significant portion of the population is a rise in earnings in the direction (conscious or unconscious) of reducing the differences in the amount of wages and chiefly in the average per capita family income. What has caused the existence of the social stereotype? Obviously, the fact that in the sphere of consumption there are two interrelated trends which to a substantial degree determine the perception by people of their standard of living, its individual characteristics and their assessment. The increase in prices which began in the previous five-year plans and is continuing at present, the shortage of foodstuffs and industrial goods and services, the necessity of spending time and money on their acquisition have caused a decline in the minds of people of the quantitative, absolute indicators of material well-being (wages, monetary income) and, correspondingly, a rise in the qualitative, relative, symbolic criteria such as the supply of material goods and services or the opportunity to acquire them. On the other hand, the deterioration of the general ecological situation has brought about an increased, compensatory demand for superior-quality foodstuffs rich in vitamins and helping to maintain health. The production, transport and other stresses caused by shortcomings in the infrastructure have also forced people to somehow compensate for the neuropsychic expenditures, in particular, by purchasing cultural and consumer goods and services which support leisure and a sensation of individual comfort.

As a consequence of these trends, in recent years there has been a substantial change in the structure of the motives for purchasing consumer goods. For an ever-broader range of semidurables and partially consumer durables, the main reasons for their acquisition are not so much and not only rational considerations related to the consumer properties of the given good (reliability, durability and so forth), a comparison of its price and the amount of the individual or family income as they are emotional, psychological, that is, ensuring domestic comfort, high-quality recreation and leisure as well as related to symbolic properties such as notions of a healthy consumption structure and a suitable style of life as a whole.

Having raised the role of the social and quality criteria for assessing activities in the sphere of consumption to the detriment of the economic ones, the designated processes and trends have objectively made difficult if not completely impossible the making of a direct, immediate assessment of the degree of social justice in the distribution and consumption sphere in the form of comparisons and correlations of own labor expenditures and the obtained remuneration in the amount of wages or family income as a whole. Under these conditions, a special role begins to be played by mediated, indirect methods of assessing social justice and the tendency toward social comparison, expressed in the fact that people assess the level of achieved prosperity in comparison with analogous indicators of other people and social

groups. Clearly, the social comparisons operate as a factor for the more rapid growth of demands in comparison with an increase in income. A more substantial gap between the desired and real amount of average family income is explained by the fact that this standard of living indicator to an incomparably greater degree reflects the possibilities of the family to satisfy material needs, being the resultant of the action of different economic, social and sociopsychological components.

Thus, one other summary consequence of the above-indicated trends was a sharp drop in the differences between the types of goods and services and to which the various sociodemographic and socioeconomic groups of the public were oriented and, in particular, those groups with a varying amount of wages and income and toward a merging of the consumer requests of all categories of the population. This has also brought about a predominance in the sphere of social awareness of increased leveling trends in comparison with soundly differentiated ones. At the basis of this has been the absolute and relative decline in the level and quality of life of the people as can be seen from the "negative" dynamics over the 5-year period in the assessments of those opportunities which family income provides for satisfying its material needs. While at the beginning of the 1980s the portion of the population experiencing difficulties in purchasing clothing as an average did not exceed one-third, at the end of the 1980s this had reached one-half while the share of those for whom the purchase of consumer durables did not entail material difficulties had dropped from 23 percent to 16 percent.

In such a situation, is it possible to rely on public opinion relative to the justice of the differentiation in income in planning social policy measures? In our opinion, the answer can only be uniformly negative.

In addition to this characteristic trait for the social stereotype of social justice in the consumption area, there is another one related to its strengthening. Thus, proposals are frequently made in the press to increase the minimum wage [3]. What does this lead to? According to the elementary statistical laws, to a reduction in the differentiation of wages, to a decline in their incentive role, as was the case 20 years ago, when the minimum wage was raised by 40-50 percent and the average wage by only 22 percent.

A social comparison, as the presently most widespread method of assessing the degree of social justice, is used in the public consciousness not only in the vertical or sociogroup aspect but also in the horizontal, spatial-territorial. Both in the opinion of many (if not a majority) of the economists as well as from the viewpoint of the inhabitants of the various regions of the nation, at present the standard of living of people has begun to depend upon the size of the population point in which they reside, its distance from a major city, that is, toward a violation of social justice in this sphere as well. What has been proposed for restoring the disrupted "territorial" justice? As one of the variations, to alter the

procedure for the state distribution of food over the nation's oblasts, placing this in an unique dependence upon the local development level of food production. In order for the state distributor to encourage local initiative, it is essential, in the opinion of one author, to leave more food to those regions in which the per capita production level of the food products is higher [4]. In other words, it has been proposed that the problem of increasing the efficiency of the agricultural sector be solved with the aid of the command-administrative system. Incidentally, other authors see the way out of the existing situation also in adopting a number of purely organizational measures.

A majority of the respondents who noted the presence of social injustice in the distribution sphere also prefer organizational measures in this sphere and favor equality. Equality and justice are perceived in a rigid, automatic relationship which excludes their dialectic. Historically this has been caused by the years-long artificial opposition between economic and moral criteria of socioeconomic phenomena generally and social justice in particular. "In all spheres of social life, we are obliged to introduce," writes N. Shmelev, "an understanding that everything which is economically inefficient is immoral and conversely that the efficient is moral" [5]. It is hard not to agree with this. But it is essential to be clearly aware that this is a difficult and protracted process. Over many decades, economic policy has categorically opposed the economy and morality. The productive labor of the peasant family, thriftiness and economy have been described as extortion and have been socially condemned. Poverty, regardless of the reasons causing it, has been viewed as a virtue. More than one generation of our people has grown up with this distorted view.

There are also examples closer in time of the mismatching of efficient labor and wages and hence, in a certain sense, morality. Thus, the bringing together of the wage levels in the 1960s and 1970s was viewed as a goal on the path of advancing to social homogeneity. In accord with this, the plans provided for higher growth rates for the lowly-paid workers regardless of the real differences in the quality and quantity of their labor. Finally, the current economic situation still does not contribute too much to restoring the lost ties between the economic and moral criteria of social development. The designated course of accelerating economic development as the sole path of raising material prosperity of the people has not been socially completely sound. The economists and writers have repeatedly tested the strength of the chain: more productive labor—a higher standard of living. "Precisely in shifting toward consumption and not compulsorily inflating the growth rates lie the main reserves for raising the standard of living," is the conclusion reached, for example, by V. Selyunin on the basis of calculations [6].

The growing difficulties of a direct, immediate assessment of the social justice of distribution and consumption, the equivalence of exchange between labor expenditures and the consumer resources have brought about an unique process of "atomization," that is, the search for individual islands of justice. The consequence of such difficulties can be seen precisely in the transition to regional cost accounting as an inevitable step on the path of establishing a united "union" market, deepening and broadening commodity-monetary relations both along the horizontal and along the vertical. Certainly, the very course of perestroika which is penetrating all spheres of social life from the economy to ideology, democracy and glasnost, will of course contribute to correcting the notions about social justice and to an organic combination of the economic and social criteria in its definition. However, the evolution of the notion of social justice is a complex, dialectically contradictory process. The activation of the broad strata of the population needed to combat the bureaucratic apparatus and have as its consequences a recurrence of leveling trends. In favoring the restructuring of the economic system and a pluralism in ownership forms, the people should realize that the result of their struggle will consist in a significant differentiation of income. In order to understand that a payment in the form of the growth of wealth for some becomes a basis for increasing the prosperity of all, there must be a high level of awareness and culture. Here, of course, the question arises of the mechanisms for redistributing high earnings within society. As we have already pointed out, the problems of establishing social justice in the sphere of distribution and consumption is an age-old question in economic science. The economist and sociologist V. Pareto asserted, in particular, that "if society is such that an increase in well-being (optimality) for some reduces it for others, its maximum amounts cannot be achieved." Moreover, if changes in society bring gain to some and nothing for others, prosperity as a whole will decline [7]. Pareto's theory was further developed in the works of J. Hicks and N. Kaldor to examine the variation when some increased their prosperity in causing harm to others and society as a whole. Hicks asserted in this context that for a rise in prosperity it is sufficient for the amount of income as a whole to exceed the amount of loss. Kaldor was more "punctilious" and proposed a so-called principle of compensation which consisted in the fact that the "gainers" in the aim of maintaining justice should pay a compensatory remuneration to the "losers."

As we see, the mechanism of income redistribution has not been improved since the economists invented it at the beginning of the century. This is one aspect of the problem. But another is—and this has been clearly shown by the data of our research—the differing strata of the population have a negative attitude toward increased income differentiation.

The natural historical process of the drawing together of needs and consumer demands of the various strata of the population, in being artificially intensified by the scarcity and narrowed assortment of consumer goods, on the

one hand, and the absolute, inflation-provoked and relative—in comparison with our increased standards and notions—decline in the level and quality of life, on the other, have caused an economic complex engendered by the state budget deficit and which has intensified the obsolete "leveling" illness. Under these conditions, the appeal to such moral and ethical components of social injustice as unearned income, large amounts of money gained dishonestly and inherited, privileges for the apparatus workers and so forth seems at present logically, historically and economically out of place and in addition causes social harm. Certainly, the listed negative phenomena show a warping of the distribution mechanisms, and a retreat from the standards of social justice but they are not their cause. For it is precisely the leveling ideology which has become our psychology that has given rise to and constantly reproduces the noneconomic, command-bureaucratic system of management with the chronic deficit and this, in turn, causes speculation, the shadow economy, covert distributors and so forth. The introduction into life of economic, self-regulating mechanisms should lead to a rise in the quantity, quality and diversity of consumer goods and services and to an improvement in the quality of the life of people. But the spread of individual and group forms of ownership, material incentives for efficient and high-quality labor will entail a new differentiation of income and this will be perceived by a portion of the public as the manifestation of injustice. For this reason, the task of the social scientist is, in our view, not to play on emotions, pointing to the illegal methods of increasing prosperity but rather to introduce into social awareness that precisely this task leads to the creation of conditions for a life worthy of modern man, to the instituting of truly socialist principles of distribution and, as a result, to social justice in the consumption sphere.

Footnotes

1. The research was conducted in two stages (I—1980-1981; II—1986-1987) and covered more than 1,000 persons. The leader was I.T. Levykin.
2. The type of asymmetry is determined relative to a normal distribution and is characterized by a relatively larger share of high values.

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Social Justice and Wages

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[Article by Yuriy Mikhaylovich Morin, candidate of economic sciences and sector head at the Scientific-Production Association Gorskisistemotekhnika in Kiev. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] The purpose of perestroyka in the economy is ultimately to realize the principle of "to each according to his labor." The failure to observe this leads to the downfall of perestroyka. It is precisely the incommensurability between labor expenditures and remuneration which has largely caused the current state of affairs in the various spheres of material production, science and services.

Naturally, the realization in actuality of the principle of payment according to labor is a complex process which includes a change in the nature of ownership and production relations, the systems of distributing remuneration and so forth. However, the most effective and illustrative form can be the elaboration of a scientifically sound system for evaluating, encouraging and placing the personnel, for a person judges the viability of the political system primarily from what amount and how justly he earns and what he can acquire in a store with his earnings. Ultimately, precisely this is the meaning of social justice, that is, obtaining as much as you are able to earn. And precisely to earn.

At present, it is a secret to no one that the results of the first years of perestroyka have not been as apparent as one might expect. The lag in the economy and scientific-technical progress has not declined. The officially declared principles of independence, self-financing and the covering of costs have not gained real embodiment. But there is one other principle of cost accounting which up to now has not been sufficiently considered but the realization of which is equally important and this is the principle of self-regulation, in the process of which a purging and stabilization of the collective will inevitably occur. If this principle is ignored in the social organization, then there will be frequent instances of the deformation of the moral and psychological climate, the rise of "cult followers" for the personality of the leaders, the contaminating of the organization with imitators of activity and fighters for a cozy spot, protectionism, personnel abuses and so forth.

Thus, the fourth obligatory condition for the new organization of labor after independence, covering of costs and self-financing is the principle of the self-regulation of the collective. From this it follows that the most serious attention must be given to personnel work even on the level of planning the demands made upon their skills and requests, on the one hand, and on the other, on the organization of their movement and advancement, on the system of providing a job future. This is an extremely important condition, as it creates a sensation of stability of the situation and justice in official labor relations.

As of the present, this principle, like the other principles of cost accounting, has not been completely realized in practice anywhere. As a result, there has been a significant exceeding of the growth rate of wages over the growth rate of labor productivity, and this has led to inflation with all the ensuing consequences.

Such a situation to a significant degree is explained by the fact that the first and second models of cost accounting which are currently being introduced are based, in essence, on expenditure principles, since wages are formed not as the actually earned but rather as a derivative from the gross. For this reason, the converting of the enterprises to cost accounting has been reduced to revising the wages of a majority of the engineer and managerial personnel (on an average these have increased by 10-20 rubles). The recertification carried out in this regard has not changed anything. Everyone has remained with his own interests, and naturally labor productivity has not increased, since the previously set salary in essence is an antiincentive factor which does not make it possible to earn more and for this reason there is no sense in working more productively. As a result, even the distribution of the saved wage fund is carried out in a voluntaristic manner, that is, by "rule of thumb" or to everyone evenly. And, as a consequence of such an approach, the person who is active and talented is unable to escape from the morass of wage leveling and he often throws up his hands, while the idler and the maladroit feel carefree and flourish.

The psychology of wage leveling is not the cause of stagnation but rather its consequence. Its most important and characteristic features can be termed an anonymity of public ownership of the means of production, the monopolization of all spheres of the management of society and its national economy as well as the bureaucratization of the management system. In other words, the roots of wage leveling lie in the total administrative-bureaucratic system and in the management methods inherent to it.

It is said that the collective represents a miniature copy of society and that social, financial, personality and many other factors operate in it. The relations within a collective do reflect the relations existing in society. In other words, any social group formed in a collective exists not merely for the sake, for instance, of the production plan but also for the sake of the individuals comprising it and has clearly formulated group interests.

Under the conditions of the administrative-bureaucratic system, these interests were eliminated from the general state ones by prohibitive sanctions and the ignoring of the sociopsychological laws of the development of the individual and the collectives. As a result, there was the alienation of man not only from the administrative system but also from the system of assessing and encouraging labor and this led to the loss of the criteria of the relationship between quantity, quality and the qualification of labor. People became accustomed to the fact that wages were to be received and not earned. Under these conditions, informal relations and informal communities assumed primary significance and in these the creative, enterprising worker was put under absolutely equal or even worse conditions with all the participants in the production relations. He was alienated from the product of his own labor and was dependent upon the bureaucrat, like all the others. For a situation where one's immediate superior is both the provider of a job and judge leads to illegality which impels a person to seek out the orders of the chief and not to work as well as possible.

In such organizations, the principle of "to each according to his labor" is replaced by the principle of "to each according to the (occupied) position" with all the ensuing consequences which can be characterized as a "status racket." Its distinguishing features are the following:

- a) The conviction that the superior should receive more than subordinates;
- b) The status method of allocating material goods (a larger bonus, more benefits and privileges to the chief) and moral incentives (awards and titles);
- c) Status declared (money, gifts and dinners) and undeclared (the inclusion of the chief as co-author of articles, books and innovative proposals) bribes. Since a status bribe is not designated by the law, it de jure is still not considered a bribe;
- d) The resistance by the leaders to the introduction of systems beyond their control for evaluating and encouraging labor whereby the wages of subordinates and themselves are objectivized;
- e) The extensive spread of bribery (the bureaucratic racket) and the turning of it into a source of constant unearned income.

The violating of moral guidelines in society also derives from the informal associations which receive unearned income. As is known, the administrative-bureaucratic system is based upon the authoritarian-bureaucratic strategy of recruiting personnel according to the principle of personal loyalty, kinship, nationality as well as according to the canons of "telephone law." The corresponding undemocratic mechanism for encouraging and transferring a worker up the official ladder is a key element of all personnel policy. The "doriki" (children of

highly-placed workers), "zhoriki" (wives of highly-placed workers), "loriki" (girlfriends of highly-placed workers) as well as friends and acquaintances are pushed into positions providing an opportunity to obtain unearned income in the form of unworked wages, unmerited bonuses, unjustified service promotions and unearned scientific titles.

As of now, we have still not worked out a sufficiently clear and efficient system of objective criteria for the assessment and encouragement of labor. Even in the worker brigades it has been very heavy going in introducing the coefficient of labor participation (CLP) as frequently wages are set approximately equal. But, in order to create the appearance of employing the CLP, the surpayments are given out in turns. Where the end results of the labor depend upon the creative potential and talents of the workers, here there is all sorts of room for voluntarism. This can be seen from the experience of a number of socioeconomic experiments such as the ASDO [Automatic Wage System] (the Riga Switchboard Plant), Pulsar (the Lvov Elektron PTO [Production-Technical Association]), Stimul (Moldglavenergo [Moldavian Main Power Administration]) and others. The results of these experiments have not become widespread and gradually were abandoned. Certification became the sole method for assessing and transferring the personnel. The flaw of this method was that it permitted the easy and secret disposal of inconvenient, unseemly and critically inclined employees. For this reason, the certifications conducted on the basis of leader recommendations at times are a form of natural selection, for the culling of dissidents and leaving those loyal to the leadership.

Thus, an infamous circle arises: the incompletely realized economic laws of socialism distort socialist morality while the moral deformations prevent the establishing and elimination of the violations of economic laws which cease to work.

The absence of mechanisms for social protection and the feeling of being the master has led to time-serving as a sociopsychological method for the survival of the individual under conditions of the impossibility of his self-realization and the necessity of somehow securing the means for existence. Precisely the absence of an opportunity to work well and receive the proper salary for this has led to the development of status bribery. It is not offered for something concrete but rather to win the good graces of the "person."

Whether we want to or not, we must recognize two things:

- 1) Wages according to the quantity and quality of labor and, consequently, distribution according to labor run contrary to wage leveling and all possible privileges;
- 2) As long as the administrative-bureaucratic system exists, the ubiquitous introduction of differentiated incentives and the placement of the personnel will be very problematic. A system oriented at fulfilling the plan

at any price, and this means at the expense of surplus workers, surplus resources and so forth and not for satisfying the needs of people and industry (otherwise you will not receive a profit), cannot create the objective indicators for the evaluation and encouragement of labor and, consequently, cannot screen out the surplus employees and save expenditures of live labor. If we wish for self-regulation to operate in society, then we must wager on the inner reserves of the collective.

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Who Will Pay for Better Housing?

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[Article by Alla Konstantinovna Guzanova, junior science associate at the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress under the USSR Academy of Sciences. Our journal has published her article "At the Meat Counter" (No 5, 1989)]

[Text] The goal of providing each family with a separate apartment or house by the year 2000 requires a sharp increase in housing construction and hence ever-greater state capital investments. The construction of a square meter of housing gets more and more expensive year by year. At the same time, the overall increase in the housing leads to a rise in state subsidies for maintaining it and the amount of the subsidies in 1987 reached 10.4 billion rubles [1, p 393].

At the same time, the housing program which is truly grandiose in terms of scale and social importance is being implemented under conditions of a deterioration of the socioeconomic situation, a state budget deficit and the absence on the consumer market of goods and services of vital necessity, and a rise in the shortfall of the commodity cover for the public's monetary income. All of this has forced emergency measures to achieve balance in the consumer sector of the economy.

For solving the housing problem, economists consider it possible to attract money from the public. Two areas are proposed:

1. The introduction of a new system of payment for the apartments, a rise in apartment rent as a whole and its closer linkage with the size and quality of the occupied area. It is correctly pointed out that the system of paying for housing which developed in the 1920s and 1930s and which corresponded to the communal principle of settlement is out of date. Except for a maximum rate of payment per square meter of housing area, it lacks quality parameters. At the same time, the proportional amount of family expenditures to pay for the apartment and utility services is comparatively low at about 3 percent [1, p 404].

2. The expansion of the ZhSK [Housing Construction Cooperative] and assistance in individual housing construction.

The economic advisability of these proposals does not evoke doubt. However, it is essential to trace their social consequences.

Precisely what social groups will be involved first in the apartment rent reform? Is the public capable of paying more for an apartment than it does now? Will such a reform lead to a redistribution of housing? What does the public think about a differentiated payment for housing? Is the public ready to settle the problem at its own expense? Is there solvent demand for cooperative housing among those who particularly need this?

For answering these questions, we drew on the results of a questionnaire sampling survey on the problem of prices conducted in 1987 by the IEP NTP AN SSSR [Institute for the Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress under the USSR Academy of Sciences] together with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA [2]. The sample was around 700 newspaper readers.

Let us examine the monetary income of the families with different housing conditions (Table 1). There is a direct linkage between the amount of housing area per family member and the average per capita income: the higher the amount of available housing, the higher the income. This fact corresponds fully to the data on family budget surveys conducted by Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics].

Table 1: Distribution of Average Per Capita Family Income Depending Upon Housing Conditions

Housing Area Per Family Member	Average Per Capita Income by Types of Housing (in months, rubles)					Average
	Without Amenities	1960 Design	Improved Layout	Private Home	Communal Apartment	
To 5 square meters	120.6	107.2	96.3	—	—	109.0
To 6 square meters	87.5	111.9	80.0	—	—	106.0
To 7 square meters	82.7	106.9	105.3	—	—	101.1
To 8 square meters	95.5	115.9	100.6	—	—	112.7
To 9 square meters	95.7	118.2	110.3	—	—	113.0
To 10 square meters	100.8	130.5	133.2	—	—	128.4

Table 1: Distribution of Average Per Capita Family Income Depending Upon Housing Conditions (Continued)

Housing Area Per Family Member	Average Per Capita Income by Types of Housing (in months, rubles)					Average
	Without Amenities	1960 Design	Improved Layout	Private Home	Communal Apartment	
To 11, 12 square meters	113.9	156.4	125.5	—	—	141.2
Over 12 square meters	149.2	149.3	155.4	—	—	149.3
Average by type of housing	109.3	131.7	128.9	115.6	126.2	127.5
Minus pensioners	—	137.3	130.7			131.1

If one uses the indicators of housing quality, such a ratio is upset. Thus, the distribution of average per capita income of respondents living in housing of the 1960 design and improved design shows that these incomes with higher quality housing is lower as a whole as well as in each group (an exception is the group where there are over 12 square meters per person). The income level of the possessors of good apartments was not high, as one might expect, but rather average. Attempts to explain this by the influence of sociodemographic factors (the structure of the family and age of the respondent) did not produce positive results. Analogous calculations (minus pensioners) show even a relative decline in the income of persons residing in improved design housing (see Table 1).

Thus, the analysis shows a redistribution of housing in favor of the high income group. As for the quality of the housing, it is extremely low among low-income families. At the same time, there has been no redistribution of good-quality housing in favor of the highly paid group.

In speaking about the social consequences of increasing apartment rent, one must consider the following circumstance. If a rent reform is carried out at the expense of those residing in good-quality housing (and such a path is socially justified) and it is considered that the complete elimination of subsidies would require a trebling of the rent [3], then in this housing the rent should rise rather significantly. But since the monetary income of the apartment renters is very average, will not such a reform lead to the forced abandonment of the apartments by their residence? An extremely high assessment by the public of housing as a consumer good does not make it possible to count on this. And the aim of the reform is to set a just apartment rent and not redistribute the housing. For this reason, it is essential first of all to give some thought to the socially unprotected population

groups (pensioners, large families and so forth) and free them from an unbearable additional rent even with high-quality housing.

If the change in apartment rent is made with an insignificant differentiation depending upon housing quality, then the reform will be carried out basically at the expense of families having average quality housing conditions. In essence, this is a direct increase in rent which from the viewpoint of the public is completely unjustified. Since the availability of housing is linked to income, there will be a certain leveling of income, a reduction in the solvent demand for material goods and services and so forth. Here the very system of paying for the apartments will not change fundamentally. It is economically and socially justified to improve the housing conditions of the materially well-off families by providing them better quality housing with a rise in rent or full payment.

A few words about introducing an increased payment for "surplus" housing. The problem is that the social composition of those having "surpluses" is very heterogeneous and includes individual pensioners, persons with benefits, the residents of communal apartments and the residents of comfortable apartments. For this reason, the question of raising the payment for surplus housing cannot be viewed in isolation from the systematizing and reduction of existing benefits for rent payment.

As for increasing rent and its significant dependence upon the availability and quality of the housing, the opinion of those questioned on this question was distributed as follows: 44 percent in favor of a rent differentiation, 49 percent against and 7 percent found it difficult to answer. The dependence of the replies upon income and housing conditions is illustrated by the data given in Table 2.

Table 2: Opinion of Public on Introduction of Differentiated Rent, %

	Average Per Capita Income, Per Month					
	Under 125 Rubles			Over 125 Rubles		
	Answers					
Availability of Housing Space Per Family Member	For	Against	No Answer	For	Against	No Answer
To 7 square meters	49	46	5	67	33	—

Table 2: Opinion of Public on Introduction of Differentiated Rent, % (Continued)

	Average Per Capita Income, Per Month					
	Under 125 Rubles			Over 125 Rubles		
	Answers					
Availability of Housing Space Per Family Member	For	Against	No Answer	For	Against	No Answer
Living in housing:						
of 1960 design	55	42	3	75	25	—
improved design	33	53	14	50	50	—
without amenities	50	42	8	50	50	—
Over 7 square meters	40	51	9	48	46	6
Living in housing:						
of 1960 design	40	53	7	48	44	8
improved design	38	54	8	43	55	2
without amenities	42	42	16	63	37	—

A rent reform is supported by groups of the public who are poorly supplied with housing (not more than 7 square meters per person) and a significant portion of them are on waiting lists. They agree to pay for future housing only if it were larger and better than the present. The share of respondents ready to increase their rent rises with an increase in income (from 49 percent to 66 percent). Persons provided with good-quality housing do not want to pay any extra money.

It is also essential to consider the psychological factors: with the providing of housing, as a rule, housing conditions are improved by a magnitude and a rise in rent is perceived less painfully. In working out the reform particular attention is to be given to establishing a just rent for new (newly completed) housing.

Thus, the conducted analysis makes it possible to choose the following direction in changing the rent system: sharply strengthen the dependence of the amount of rent per meter of total area upon the quality of the apartment. The new system is designed not only for a redistribution of payment for the existing housing but also for a correct payment for newly completed. The reform provides increased rent in erecting new housing with increased consumer demand as well as a reduction in rent in the event of obsolete housing.

The public is ready to invest personal funds in future housing both in the form of increased rent for the apartment as well as its full purchase. According to our data, a significant portion of the population (20 percent) would like to improve its housing conditions by joining a ZhSK. This decision is determined not only by the availability of sufficient money to the respondents. There are many seeking to join a ZhSK in all the income groups, however the persons having low and average incomes would like to obtain a long-term credit for these purposes (Table 3).

Table 3: Distribution of Answers to Question: Do You Wish to Join a ZhSK? by Income Groups, %

Average Per Capita Income Per Family Member Per Month	Replies			
	Yes	Yes, With Long-Term Credit	No, This Does Not Suit Me	No Answer
Under 50 rubles	0	17	78	5
51-75 rubles	0	13	75	12
76-100 rubles	3	15	73	9
101-125 rubles	8	11	67	14
126-150 rubles	3	15	72	10
151-175 rubles	8	16	55	21
176-200 rubles	6	10	70	14
Over 200 rubles	6	19	67	8
Average for sample	4	14	70	12

The desire to purchase a cooperative apartment is caused by the severe housing conditions (Table 4). For example, in families where there is not more than 6 m per person, the number of persons desiring to join a ZhSK is 30-40 percent.

Table 4: Distribution of Reply to Question "Would You Like to Join a ZhSK?" Depending Upon Housing Availability, %

Housing Area Per Family Member	Replies			
	Yes	Yes, With Long-Term Credit	No, This Does Not Suit Me	No Answer
Under 5 square meters	8	21	71	0
Under 6 square meters	5	34	58	3
Under 7 square meters	3	16	79	2

Table 4: Distribution of Reply to Question "Would You Like to Join a ZhSK?" Depending Upon Housing Availability, % (Continued)

Housing Area Per Family Member	Replies			
	Yes	Yes, With Long-Term Credit	No, This Does Not Suit Me	No Answer
Under 8 square meters	4	18	68	10
Under 9 square meters	5	19	75	1
Under 10 square meters	3	14	74	9
Under 11, 12 square meters	8	8	62	22
Over 12 square meters	2	5	75	18
Total	4	14	70	12

A readiness to joining the ZhSK, even amongst the most lowly-paid (Table 3) and the poorest housed (Table 4) is yet another affirmation that the existing mechanism for allocating housing which supposedly guarantees its gratis providing to persons in need does not work.

At the same time, there is a solvent demand for cooperative housing among the public with an extremely severe housing situation. The question arises as to why this category is not provided with housing on a paid basis. How can we broaden the use of payment in the housing sphere and guarantee here that the situation of those in acute need will not deteriorate? How can we interest a person on a waiting list to acquire lowly-paid housing?

Since there are gratis forms of providing housing, its purchase for full payment should clearly guarantee high quality. However, recently precisely the reverse trend has been noticed. According to the statistical data [1, p 513], the quality of the cooperative apartments in 1976-1980 (for such indicators as the average size of the apartment and the proportional amount of housing area was somewhat higher than in the state-owned apartments. However, by 1985, the designated indicators were leveled out. The basic reason, in our view, is the construction of high-quality gratis housing by the departments.

The mechanism for allocating such a scarce consumer good as housing has the following features:

1. The gratis providing of housing to those in acute need in rather limited amounts and with a low or average quality.

2. Providing housing that is completely paid for to persons in need in somewhat less limited amounts and with average quality (with a trend for an increase in price and decline in quality).

3. Gratis providing of housing at increased rates and high quality (with a trend toward improving it) depending upon the social status and the departmental affiliation of the worker.

The high demands on quality are caused by the increased demands on the full-amenity housing. In erecting comfortable housing, the achievements of scientific-technical progress and new urban development forms are employed. With the current level in the development of housing construction and the housing availability, an apartment in such a building is an unique consumer good.

In this context, it would be advisable to propose that the possessors of state-owned high-quality apartments purchase them in accord with their consumer value. The adopting of such a decision could entail a whole series of problems, both economic and social. The mechanism of its practical implementation has still not been worked out. However, in broadening cooperative construction it is essential to do everything so that all the newly completed high-category housing is paid for. This applies to houses built according to individual plans with additional amenities as well as to expensive brick houses of increased consumer demand.

Who at present could purchase comfortable and extensive housing? Certainly the well-off persons. Unfortunately, at the present time it is impossible to provide such housing to all the persons so desiring or even the persons on the waiting lists of the ZhSK due to the limited housing construction capacity and the more cooperative housing there is the less the gratis.

However, there is also a solvent demand for housing among those in acute need. For this reason, we propose the providing of high-quality housing to this category alone on more rigid grounds than for joining an ordinary ZhSK. At first, everyone who has the right to receive a gratis state-owned apartment could become a possible contender for high-quality housing. Understandably, such a decision is just in relation to the sufficiently prosperous groups of the public, the housing conditions of whom correspond to their earnings.

It is advisable to completely give up the gratis providing of new comfortable housing.

In our view, the proposed measures do not require any radical changes in the existing procedure for housing allocation and are sufficiently simple to implement. These will help to balance the consumer sector of the economy, eliminate the subsidies for the housing system, broaden the use of full payment in the housing sphere as well as aid the just distribution of the public's income.

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Czechoslovak Women in Science

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[Julius Sedljak is a candidate of philosophical sciences and head of the Lab for the Theory of Science and Forecasts at the Computer Center of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. This is the first time he appears in our journal]

[Text] As is the case throughout the world, in the CSSR the number of persons employed in the science sphere is growing. Thus, over the last 10 years this doubled. As for women, their share rose not only among specialists in the humanities but also among those engaged in the natural and technical sciences. Although the socialist state has made women equal in rights with men, the problem of female discrimination in science remains.

In 1985, women made up 51.3 percent in the total population of the CSSR and 46.4 percent of those employed in the national economy. Among the scientific workers their share is approximately one-half. However, from the viewpoint of scientific skills, women significantly lag behind the men: Thus, in 1975, just 13.7 percent of the women had an academic degree and in 1980, 26 percent.

It must be pointed out that in the gymnasiums [secondary schools] and technical schools, more women are studying (over 60 percent) than men. But upon admission to the VUZes, their share declines (less than 45 percent). To a large degree this is due to the fact that at an age of 17-20 years, many young women (44 percent) get married and begin having children. Naturally, their desire to have a career for a certain time moves into the background. This is a critical period when for the first time a woman is in an unequal position with the man. In postwar Czechoslovakia, there has been a significant rise in the number of students, including women. Many young women are studying specialties which in the past were exclusively male and they participate in the work of the student scientific societies. Clearly, in the future the share of female students in the technical, artistic and agricultural institutions of learning will rise. However, the absolute predominance of women in the pedagogical VUZes is considered to be a negative fact by us for the raising of schoolchildren as the feminization is obvious.

In studying the professional growth of young (under 31 years) scientific workers and which we carried out in the CSSR in 1984 in 57 scientific research institutes and VUZes, the following data were obtained. Around a third of them was women. The second critical period for women who set out on a scientific career is linked to the years after completing the institute. This is a very important period from the viewpoint of their vocational and social adaptation. Immediately after receiving her diploma, a majority (62.8 percent) of the female graduates marries. At this time they are confronted with problems caused by married life, concern for an apartment, nurseries and creches, monetary questions and so forth.

Some 66.3 percent of the female scientific co-workers is married, and 15.4 percent is not and the remainder is divorced. Among them 19.9 percent have no children and among the male scientific workers the figure is 14.9 percent. Thus, in the second critical period a significant portion of the creatively gifted women prefer a scientific career to marriage. Finally, a relatively high percentage of divorcees among them shows the miscomprehension of their professional interests by the spouse.

The question of the unequal position of women in science will be clearer if we view their professional advancement. In the Hungarian and Slovak Academies of Sciences at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, there was respectively 2.3 percent and 9.7 percent women who were deputy directors of institutes and 9.5 percent and 8.6 percent department heads.

Analogous data are given in an article by O.A. Voronina devoted to the situation of Soviet women: "In science, the most 'advanced' sphere of the national economy...women comprise...around one-half of the employees, but among the science associates they are 40 percent, among the candidates of sciences 28 percent, doctors of sciences 14 percent, and professors, corresponding members and academicians 1 percent" [1].

Clearly, the role of women who are leaders of scientific collectives is underestimated. The share of women leaders in science is not increasing. In this sphere patriarchal traditions are strongest. It can be said that the situation of women in science is determined by the men. Often in reorganizations and personnel cutbacks in scientific research organizations, the first to suffer are the women and their labor is assessed lower. Instances are known when women having a great scientific potential are retired on pension earlier than men. For example, in the CSSR men have the right to retire on pension at an age of 60 (plus 5 years for leaders employed in science), and women may do this 3 years earlier (minus 2 years for each born child). For this reason, a female scientist who has two children is often forced to leave work at the age of 58. There are scientific organizations where a majority of the co-workers is women, however the leadership is made up of males and often those who for years have not carried out any new research and are engaged exclusively in management.

We have examined the situation of women in science which existed in the CSSR in the 1970s. But the last results (they were assembled in 1988 by a co-worker of the Lab for the Theory of Science and Forecasts at the Slovak Academy of Sciences, V. Cernak) confirm that the designated problems remain unresolved. Moreover, the situation has deteriorated. Thus, in 1986, of the 180 scientists who received the degree of doctor of sciences, only 8.3 percent was women. As before, there were fewer women candidates of sciences than there were male candidates of sciences and much fewer of them among the doctors of sciences. An analogous situation is also characteristic in awarding them the titles of docent and professor.

The less qualified work, participation in less creative projects and a low status lead to a situation where women end up in a disadvantageous situation. But, regardless of this, women achieve significant scientific results. They are responsible for 14 percent of all the scientific discoveries which have been officially registered in the CSSR in 1987 in the instance when the researcher collective consisted exclusively of women and 18.8 percent in mixed collectives.

One of the ways for solving the problem is to have a differentiated approach in the social policy of the state toward women employed in science. For example, extending the leave for taking care of a child for a period up to 3 years is a great aid for working women. However, such a long break in employment has a negative effect upon the further scientific career of the female scientists. In various countries, efforts are made to help them in different ways: in the United States the working time is reduced for young mothers, in the GDR they are released from noncreative work during the period of caring for the child. For helping women who hold high scientific positions, family nurseries are organized and here the child can also remain in the event of illness as material aid is paid to them to hire a nurse and so forth.

We have not set the goal of providing a formula for solving all of the raised problems but rather we have focused our attention on defining their importance and have brought out in the creative career of female scientists the critical periods and their times of occurrence. However, it is still essential to elucidate the reliable reasons of their occurrence and determine the possible methods of successfully overcoming them. We must continue the search for flexible solutions which consider the specific features of scientific labor.

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Female Employment in Tajikistan

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[Article by Safro Yusupovna Isayeva, candidate of economic sciences and head of the Economic Department of Sociological Research at the Tajik Gosplan. This is the first time she appears in our journal]

[Text] Employment in the Central Asian Republics is one of the acute socioeconomic problems. The surviving disproportion between the available labor resources and the number of jobs, the increase in the number of unemployed in social production—all of this creates significant difficulties in the region's development [1, 2]. One of the most important, albeit rarely investigated aspects of this problem is female employment. At first, a bit about the general trends. Since the end of the 1950s to the mid-1960s, there was the most intense release of females from the sphere of housework and the private subsidiary farm and their incorporation into social production. Suffice it to say that the share of women of working age here increased over these years by 16 points [3, p 106].

As a whole for the nation in the mid-1960s, the proportional amount of women among the employed in social production was established at a level of 50 percent, while in Tajikistan for more than two decades the figure was 38-39 percent [4, p 107].

Clearly, the above-noted factors which form both the demand of the economy for manpower as well as the demand of the public to work in social production have been significantly less apparent in Tajikistan. The proportional among of industrial workers and white-collar personnel increase over the period of 1965-1987 by from just 14.3 percent to 15.9 percent in the republic; in construction there was even a decline in the share of workers from 8.7 to 8.3 percent. A certain rise in the number of employees was observed during the designated period only in the sectors of the production sphere with, respectively, a rise from 19.7 to 24.3 percent [5, p 149]. It is important to point out that female employment has been and remains particularly low.

The main reason for the existing situation is the high birthrate. In 1965, over 92,000 children were born in the republic, in 1985, there were over 182,000, and in 1987, over 204,000 [5, p 144].

The overall birthrate which for almost 8 years (1975-1983) kept in an interval of 37-38.3 percent, in 1984, rose in a jump by 1.6 of a point and in 1987 was already 41.7 percent [5, p 143]. To a definite degree such growth was caused by the action of factors of a structural nature. There was an increase in the number of those who entered child-bearing age, particularly women of the most suitable ages (15-19 and 20-29 years).

During the designated period, the increase in the birthrate was also influenced by the fact that while in the

mid-1960s people more often married at the age of 20-24 and 25-29 years, from the second half and particularly after 1970, in the total number of concluded marriages there has been a rise in the share of women of the younger age cohorts.

At the same time, a study of the special birthrates shows that from the mid-1970s the republic had a tendency for a decline in the birthrate and in the first stage this was manifested in a decline in the intensity of births among women under the age of 20 and over 30. The orientation of families to large size began to weaken. Thus, in 1970, 57 percent of the children born were children of the 4th order and higher, and in 1975, 49.6 percent; in the following 5 years the figures, respectively, were 42 percent and 38 percent and in 1987, 37.2 percent. (Calculated from the data of current demographic statistics.)

The decline in the birthrate among urban dwellers in the aggregate with the migration noted from the mid-1970s (basically from cities with low migration capacity) of the public outside Tajikistan has led to an increase in the share of rural inhabitants. In 1975, this equaled 62 percent, and at the beginning of 1988, already 67 percent [5, p 140].

Of course, the demographic factor has impeded the labor activeness of women in the republic. However, there is also an inverse dependence, namely the most important factor for the drop in the birthrate has been the employment of women in social production, and employment not per se but rather those conditions which accompany it and, above all, a rise in the educational and cultural-technical level of the women.

According to the data of the 1979 population census for Tajikistan, the number of children among women having a higher, incomplete higher and specialized secondary education was 2-fold less than among those who had completed just secondary school. Thus, definite prerequisites for a drop in the birthrate arise not as a result of the employment of women in social production but only in those sectors and spheres of activity where a higher level of knowledge is essential.

As for the individual economic sectors of Tajikistan, over the period from 1965 to 1987, there were most women employed in industry, however the corresponding indicator virtually did not change over these years. In construction, the share of women declined by 2.0 points, in the housing-utility system and domestic services by 7.4 points, and in public health by more than 6 points. An increase in the proportional amount of women was observed in such sectors as public education (by 4.7 points), science and scientific services (by 12.2) and the apparatus of administrative bodies (by 2.5). Finally, in agriculture the share of women increased by 8 points. As a whole out of all the women employed in republic social production (including the kolkhozes), around 40 percent was in agriculture. It must be added that in line with the seasonal working conditions, female employment here, as a rule, is limited to 5 months a year.

The difference between the maximum and minimum monthly employment of kolkhoz members and sovkhoz employees in individual periods reaches 200,000-250,000 persons. (Calculated from the data of the annual reports of the Tajik kolkhozes and sovkhozes.)

In rural localities one can also observe a decline in the intensity of childbirth in the age groups from 30 years and older and, in addition, an absolute drop in the number of 6-8 births. Nevertheless, the nature of labor in the agrarian sector of the republic has not had a substantial impact on the educational and cultural-technical level of the women and through these conditions on deepening the trends for a drop in the birthrate.

A majority of the women (around 65 percent) employed in the republic agriculture did not receive any specialty whatsoever and did not have a profession. The hand-picking of cotton, the preparing of feed, the harvesting of vegetables, grapes and so forth—this is the ordinary utilization of the female labor force.

One of the reasons for the relative "expulsion" of women from a number of the sectors of the Tajik economy is the gap between the number of created jobs in the sphere of social production and the increase in labor resources. In the republic, a situation has come into being when each year more women are finishing the general education school, however among the students of the VUZes, the students of the secondary schools and PTU [vocational-technical school] there are significantly fewer women than men. On the other hand, if with the pace set over the last 20 years in creating jobs, an approximately equal number of young men and women would have received vocational training in the various schools and the ratio between the annually job-placed men and women would have been comparable, then a significant portion of the able-bodied men would have been "out of work."

Males, thus, have occupied the offered jobs even in those sectors where many types of jobs are traditionally considered female (accounting and planning, public health, trade and public dining) while the "unplaced" women during that time were basically engaged in housework, including the private subsidiary farms. The latter during all these years in Tajikistan has served as a sphere of application of labor for a significant contingent of persons not participating in social production for objective reasons (mothers with large families, pensioners, juveniles and so forth) or participating in this only partially (seasonal kolkhoz members and sovkhoz workers). Here the share of the product produced in this area in the total volume of republic agricultural product has been very high: 35.6 percent of the meat and suet (dressed), 49.2 percent of the milk and 11 percent of the eggs [5, p 88].

Thus, the low rate of creating jobs in comparison with the growth rate of the labor resources and most importantly the existing sectorial structure of employment in Tajikistan not only have been unable to provide any noticeable rise in employment in the economy but also have not contributed to a substantial increase in the

educational and vocational level of the public, and have not influenced the shaping of the demand primarily for women to participate in social production.

In conclusion, we would like to voice certain considerations on the question of the demographic situation in the republic, although these are not directly related to the employment of female labor. An analysis indicates that in the next 10-15 years, the growth rate of labor resources in Tajikistan as before will remain the highest in the nation. The main task in the area of their rational employment consists not only in the maximum involvement of the entire increase of the labor resources in social production but also the shaping of a sectorial structure for employment which would create objective prerequisites for a substantial improvement in the qualitative characteristics of manpower. Here priority should be given to the labor-intensive sectors of industry and the nonproduction sphere.

The rational utilization of the labor resources in rural localities is impossible without creating a developed agroindustrial complex with advanced equipment and production methods. This will make it possible to reduce the expenditures of live labor in the agrarian sector of the republic and substantially influence the content of the labor of the employees engaged in it.

In paying primary attention to social production, one must not forget that Tajikistan has utilized far from all opportunities to develop the private subsidiary farm. In considering the inertia of the demographic processes and the high share of rural inhabitants, it may be assumed that the private subsidiary farm for some time to come will be an additional sphere for the employment of labor for a certain portion of the able-bodied population. The favorable natural and climatic conditions, the presence of abandoned lands, mountainous and piedmont territories, the tilling and development of which are disadvantageous for large farms—all of this argues in favor of such an assumption.

It would be advisable to have the development and location in the republic of enterprises producing tools and small-sized equipment designed for running the private subsidiary farm and for processing small quantities of the produced products. This will create additional jobs and ease labor and increase labor productivity. The peasant will gain the skills of industrial labor.

Achieving rational employment for the population of Tajikistan is impossible without increasing its migrational mobility and intensifying internal and interpublic migration. The latter depends largely upon accelerating the republic's socioeconomic development and upon the closely related rise in the vocational and educational level of the public.

In our view, the proposal for the mass resettlement of the entire expected increase in the labor resources in the Central Asian Region up to the year 2000 [see 6] into the new development areas of Khabarovsk Kray and Amur Oblast is, to say the least, artificial. The weightiest

argument in favor of such a "relocating" is the impossibility due to the shortage of internal skilled working personnel of having the republics of the region handle such a volume of capital investments which would bring about a sharp rise in the jobs in social production over the next 15-20 years. But it remains unclear just in what manner over this time interval those same republics which do not possess skilled manpower will be able to handle an even larger volume of capital investments (with the addition of the expenditures on resettlement) in another territory.

From our viewpoint, it is essential and possible to establish in the Central Asian Region those objective conditions whereby the migrational activeness of the population would rise. It is a question first of all of industrializing the economy, accelerating the urbanization process and so forth. Finally, it is scarcely correct to aim at increasing the influx into the sphere of social production and, consequently, on a sharp increase in the number of jobs.

From the viewpoint of the rational employment of the labor resources as well as the changes outlined in the reproductive and migrational behavior of the population, it seems more important to bring about an improvement in the structure of the economy and the sectorial structure of employment in Tajikistan.

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City-to-Countryside Migration

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[Article by Ravil Talibovich Nasibullin, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent at the Ufa Aviation Institute imeni S. Ordzhonikidze and the author of the monograph "Kollektivy stanut stabilnymi" [The Collectives Become Stable] (1988). Our journal has published his articles "Professional Mobility of the Intelligentsia" (No 2, 1980, co-author), "Reader Letters to the Editors of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as a Source of Information on Population Movement" (No 5, 1987)]

[Text] The migration of the population from city to countryside is secondary migration, when persons who have moved at one time from the countryside into the city return to their former place of residence. Here masses of people leave their customary sociocultural environment, they endeavor to adapt to the new urban life and return back, not being able to adapt to it.

Entire regions have formed where the loss of rural inhabitants brought the rural economy to the brink of disaster. Simultaneously, a mass of people accumulated in the cities and they had the corresponding professional training and wanted to move to live and work in the countryside.

The party's agrarian policy at the present stage consists in a fundamental change in the production relations in the countryside and it is aimed at a fundamental change in the conditions of life of the rural workers and is creating a new situation in the movement of the population.

The migration of the population is a complex social process. It is generally recognized that this contributes to the development of the population. As for the movement of the people from the city into the countryside, here there is the introduction of the urban into the rural, whether this is a question of the viewpoint of people and their labor, professional skills, the development of needs and a system of value orientations, way of life. Thus, the overall, accelerator (in the terminology of T.I. Zaslavskaya) function of migration is carried out due to the introduction of the progressive into the lagging, although certainly far from everything urban can be uniformly considered as progressive. Another function of migration—the redistribution of the population—also has its specific features with the migration from the city into the countryside providing not a simple redistribution of the labor resources but rather a redistribution in favor of the countryside as the countryside receives professionally better trained manpower. Migration from the city to the countryside helps to reduce the consequences of the created skew in the demographic structure.

Migration of the population from the city to the countryside is heterogeneous in its composition. In it one can isolate three basic currents:

1. Organize, when the move from the city to the countryside is carried out on the basis of previously adopted measures in a planned and centralized manner. It is a question here of the graduates of VUZes, technical schools and PTU [vocational-technical school] who are sent to work in the countryside.
2. Agricultural, when the move from the city to the backward, acutely labor-short farms is carried out by the state bodies in job placement.
3. Unorganized individual, when the decision to move from the city to the countryside is taken and implemented between the farm and the worker on a basis of reciprocal agreement.

Certainly there is much that is arbitrary in such a grouping. For example, organized movements, like individual ones, are carried out under reciprocal agreement of the parties. As for the social aspect, one can scarcely view as equivalent a return to one's home village by the graduate of an agricultural academy and a person who, having left the village, for a long time tries to organize his life in the country and being deceived in his expectations, resolves to go back.

It must be considered that in both the organized movements and in the allocation of the school graduates there is much that is unexpected. Thus, the job placement bodies in the recruitment areas who handle the agricultural movements are guided solely by quantitative indicators, by plan fulfillment and not the settling in of the migrants. Often the contracts are concluded with irresponsible persons, with persons who do not have professions as livestock raisers, equipment operators or construction workers and who are particularly essential in the countryside.

As for the young specialist graduates from the schools, a significant portion of them simply never arrive at the assigned area, many of them leave it without having worked the required 3 years [1]. Over the last five-year plan, for example, some 1,307 young specialists were sent to the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Amur Oblast, but one out of five has left the countryside [2]. It is even harder to settle the problems of the teachers and the cultural and educational workers as the plan for their allocation is chronically not fulfilled [3].

City-to-countryside migration, particularly the unorganized, leads to enormous working time losses. Research conducted, for example, in Ufa shows that the interruption in employment involved with a move was over 50 days. There are also covert losses. A person who has resolved to leave the city and has submitted a request for dismissal does not work at full force during the remaining time and his labor productivity drops and social activeness declines. It must also be considered that having moved to a new place of residence and found a

job there, a person cannot immediately, from the very first day, become involved in the production process. Time is needed for him to begin to work fully and to adapt at the new place. The adaptation process is very complex, since, having moved from the city to the countryside, a person not only changes the place of employment but also his entire way of life. Moreover, he must often undergo retraining and master uncanny skills. At the same time, migration from the city to the countryside also has positive aspects both for the individual and for society as a whole.

Let us examine such an example. A person is unable to satisfy his needs in the city. It is scarcely advisable to keep him there particularly if normal housing conditions are lacking or it is impossible to provide the family with food products. Having moved to the countryside, he will be able to resolve these problems.

For a very long time, state funds were used generously in the cities to create new jobs. The conversion of the economy to predominantly an intensive path will create a real opportunity for releasing surplus working hands.

An important problem is to keep the migrants at the new place of residence and have them adapt to the new conditions. First of all, this concerns differences in the level of the socioeconomic development of the city and countryside and these remain very marked.

In the first place, it is essential to consider the level of the socioeconomic and cultural-domestic development of the cities. One can isolate four stages of urban settlement: type I—Moscow, Leningrad and the capitals of the Union republics; type II—the oblast and large industrial centers; III—large cities with a developed economy; IV—small towns.

Secondly, the observance of social justice in the distribution of goods between inhabitants. For example, in Ufa there are numerous persons who live one person in

a four-room apartment as well as those who crowd five into a 10-meter room [4]. Thirdly, the socioeconomic and cultural-domestic development of the countryside as there are villages which differ fundamentally from one another and there are completely different opportunities for satisfying the needs of the people.

Research on migration problems was conducted by the Sociological Laboratory of the Ufa Aviation Institute with the direct involvement of the author in 1976-1986. At the passport desks of the police bodies in the towns of Uchaly and Sterlitamak of the Bashkir ASSR and Magnitogorsk in Chelyabinsk Oblast, a complete questionnaire poll was taken of those persons leaving these cities. Her method envisaged a poll in the wintertime, spring, summer and autumn in order to avoid distorting the information due to the "seasonal" nature of the migration. In the three cities some 2,452 questionnaires were obtained filled out by persons leaving for the countryside.

Among those leaving for the countryside from Magnitogorsk there were more women than men, respectively, 53.4 percent and 46.6 percent, and from Uchaly and Sterlitamak there were fewer with 41.9 percent and 45.4 percent. Magnitogorsk is a monofunctional city, where predominantly male labor is employed. Here it is difficult for a woman to find a job corresponding to her needs.

Migration is an instrument for regulating the population structure of both the city and the countryside. This is important since the particular features of production development in recent decades have led to a strong warping of the structure of the rural population by sex toward an increase in the share of men. In certain villages the absence of brides has become a more acute problem than the shortage of specialists.

The composition of the migrants by age, as is shown by the research results, differs substantially in the "city-to-city" and "city-to-countryside" flows (see the table).

Age Composition of Migrants, %

	Migration Flows							
	To Cities and Urban-Type Settlements				To Rural Locality			
	Under 30	30-39	40-49	50 and Older	Under 30	30-39	40-49	50 and Older
Cities								
Sterlitamak	74.5	13.4	6.3	5.8	30.6	9.6	5.4	4.4
Uchaly	79.1	12.8	6.5	1.6	83.2	8.4	6.7	1.7
Magnitogorsk	74.1	14.2	6.6	5.1	78.3	16.2	4.5	1.0

In all three cities there were more persons under the age of 30 in the city-to-countryside flow than in the city-to-city flow. However, this is explained by different circumstances. In Sterlitamak and Magnitogorsk, there are higher and specialized secondary institutions of learning, the graduates of which are allocated for work both to the city and to the countryside. On the other hand, the composition of migrants has its own age structure in each city. Thus, Uchaly in industrial terms is less developed than the two other cities

and is more closely linked to its rural surroundings which are the main supplier of manpower. At the same time, the age composition of the migrants is not a reflection of the age structure of the city population. It can be said that the older the age group, the lower the share of migrants in it and the share of persons leaving for the countryside is even less among them.

Among the migrants of the studied cities, the representatives were from all groups of the urban population. For

example, in the city-to-city flow, 72.1 percent was workers, 19.2 percent representatives of the intelligentsia and 5.6 percent white-collar personnel; in the city-to-countryside flow, 71.1 percent was workers, 16.5 percent representatives of the intelligentsia and 6.3 percent white-collar personnel.

In speaking about the prevalence of workers among the migrants, it is essential to point out the following: the workers of highly skilled labor were 6.6 percent, skilled labor 72.5 percent, low-skill 12.2 percent and unskilled 8.7 percent.

However, if one analyzes the composition of the migration flows by cities, we will note substantial differences. For example, the share of workers from highly skilled labor among the migrants of the city-to-city flow is double their share in the city-to-countryside flow. Conversely, workers of low-skill and unskilled labor are 20 percent in the city-to-city flow and 25 percent in the city-to-countryside flow.

In terms of the social characteristics of the migrants from the city into the countryside, the given data provide grounds to draw two conclusions.

All worker groups are involved in the city-to-countryside flow of migrants as well as in the city-to-city flow. This undoubtedly is of positive significance for improving the social structure of both the countryside and the city. In the city-to-countryside migration a majority is made up of workers of skilled and highly skilled labor. The countryside as yet cannot provide them with the corresponding job and the living and working conditions which they count on.

Migration assumes a dismissal from the former job and job placement in the new place of residence. For this reason it is closely linked to such a form of manpower migration as personnel turnover. The closeness of this connection can be judged from the results of the conducted questionnaire. In Sterlitamak, Uchaly and Magnitogorsk, we questioned 5,148 persons. A significant share of the dismissals was due to the fact that the workers decided to change their place of residence and leave the city. For this reason, at the time of the questionnaire some 15.7 percent of those questioned had been dismissed in Sterlitamak, 10.3 percent in Magnitogorsk and 10.8 percent in Uchaly.

In turn, migration also rather frequently leads to dismissals. This is confirmed by the research as many respondents pointed to the dismissal from work as the main reason for changing the place of residence: 31.1 percent in Uchaly, 23.1 percent in Magnitogorsk and 22.4 percent in Sterlitamak. Among these 18.4 percent was 16-19 years of age, 38.4 percent was 20-24 years, 20.5 percent was 25-29 years and 6.3 percent was 30-34 years.

It must be considered that the formulation of the reason for dismissal "at one's own request" includes a broad spectrum of motives reflecting the failure to satisfy the needs of a person.

In speaking about the relationship of city-to-countryside migration with personnel turnover, it is essential to bear in mind that this can be indirect. For example, a person is dismissed at his own request, since he is not satisfied with the job.

Migration from the city to the countryside is often accompanied by a change in profession. Among the workers questioned by us, 58.1 percent was changing his specialty (profession). And many had done this several times.

Unfortunately, up to now we have lacked a system for recording the professional mobility of personnel. For this reason the main source of information remains a questionnaire poll. Many respondents changed their profession due to the absence of employment in their own specialty at the new place of residence. In Sterlitamak, 39.1 percent of those questioned indicated this factor, 36.8 percent in Magnitogorsk and 34.6 percent in Uchaly. Such vocational changes can scarcely be viewed as socially necessary or brought about by scientific and technical progress.

Migration is an important tool by which social changes can be implemented: having moved to the city, the representatives of the peasantry fill out the ranks of the working class and, conversely, having obtained an education in the city, the persons originating from a rural locality become workers in mental labor. Dissatisfaction with one's social position also leads to a decision to change place of residence. In our poll, for example, one out of ten who moved from the city to the countryside explained his decision by a desire to have his own farm.

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